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TORT SUITS FILED BY RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS IN CIVIL
COURTS: LESSONS FOR COURTS,
CLASSROOMS AND CONSTITUENCIES
Ellen M. Bublick*
HEN Los Angeles Lakers star guard Kobe Bryant and a
nineteen-year-old Colorado woman who had accused him of
rape, abandoned the criminal process last fall, no one argued
that the process had worked well. Prosecutors' charge that Mr. Bryant
had raped the woman was never adjudicated. Instead, a series of inept
blunders by the criminal court led to repeated public release of sealed
documents, the woman's complete loss of privacy, and her abandonment
of the case.1 When the parties stepped out of this failed process, they did
not relinquish their prior controversy, but instead transported it to a new
forum-civil adjudication. After reaching a settlement, the parties re-
ported that the case was "resolved to the satisfaction of both parties."'2 If
true, this would have been no small achievement. For the parties to use
this forum to resolve their dispute on mutually agreeable terms and move
forward-a result that both must have desperately wanted after all of the
pain that the criminal process inflicted on them3-then perhaps the civil
forum served its function. And yet, the public has scant basis on which to
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Law. A.B. Duke University, J.D. Harvard Law School. Many thanks to the organizers of
the National Sexual Assault Law Institute and the Beyond Prosecution Conference at Suf-
folk University Law School. Particular thanks to Susan Vickers of the National Victims'
Rights Law Center, who encouraged me to return to this topic of civil actions in cases of
sexual assault. Thanks also to my research assistant Aeryn Heidemann for her prompt,
exacting, and insightful work, and to Barbara Atwood, Jack Chin, Suzanne Diaz, Jo Evelyn
Ivey, David Jacobs, Mary Koss, Marc Miller, Richard Posner, Susan Schwen, Ken Simons,
and the editors of the SMU Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions on an earlier
draft.
1. Kirk Johnson, The Bryant Trial: Anatomy of a Case that Fell Apart, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2004, at A14.
2. Kirk Johnson, Settlement Is Reached in Bryant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at
A14 [hereinafter Johnson, Settlement].
3. See, e.g., Wire Reports, SUN-SENTINEL, Jun. 28, 2005 (reporting the criminal convic-
tion of a man who made seventy profanity-laced death threats to the accuser and prosecu-
tor in the Kobe Bryant case); Ed Caesar, Not a Very Good Endorsement, INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 31, 2005 (noting that Kobe Bryant lost renewal of contracts with McDonald's and
Ferrero and about $4-6 million in endorsements as a result of the scandal).
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judge the fairness of this result. 4 Little is known about either the terms of
the settlement or the underlying merits of the case-resolution having
been reached not only before trial but also before either party was
deposed.5
But while little can be said of the fairness of the civil process in the
Kobe Bryant case itself, more can and should be known about the use of
civil suits in rape and sexual assault cases more broadly-whether used as
a direct substitute for the criminal process, as in the Kobe Bryant case, or
against parties unlikely to be subject to criminal charges at all, as in re-
cent cases filed against archdioceses for their failure to adequately re-
spond to child sexual assault by priests.6
This article begins to bridge the gap between the current wide-ranging
use of tort suits in sexual assault cases and the limited public knowledge
about these suits. In particular the article has three goals. First, it brings
to light the varied and increasing number of civil suits pursued by sexual
assault victims. 7 Specifically, the article examines tort actions that were
filed by victims of sexual assault and resolved by state appellate courts,
particularly state supreme courts, in the five years from January 1, 2000 to
December 31, 2004. The article addresses the dramatic increase in appel-
late-level litigation over the last thirty years even absent formal legal
changes in the definitions of many of the underlying torts themselves.
This increase in litigation, along with changes in the nature of the lawsuits
filed, reflects specific doctrinal developments, as well as broader changes
of social norms.
Second, in light of the tort actions filed by victims of sexual assault and
resolved by appellate courts in the 2000 to 2004 time period (a large num-
ber of actions in spite of the limited time frame), this article addresses a
question raised years ago and presented with increased public interest
4. Jon Sarche, Civil Lawsuit Against Bryant Settled; Terms are Kept Secret, COURIER-
J., Mar. 3, 2005, at 1C (noting the parties statements that no further comments on the
matter will be made and speculating that the settlement agreement likely contains penal-
ties for revealing any details).
5. Johnson, Settlement, supra note 2, at A14.
6. See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (analyzing a suit by parishio-
ners against archdiocese for claims related to sexual assaults by priest); Pam Belluck, Dio-
cese Is the First to Settle a Criminal Case Over Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at A31
(reporting that the Roman Catholic Diocese of Manchester, New Hampshire, was the first
diocese to settle a criminal suit, ending plans to file charges against it, and that no other
diocese in the country has ever faced criminal charges); 70 More Bring Sexual Abuse Law-
suits in Boston Archdiocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at A14 (stating that some 470 out-
standing lawsuits had been filed against the archdiocese or its priests stemming from sexual
assault claims).
7. In some of the cases reviewed in this article, assailants were convicted, had default
judgments entered against them, or were found liable by a jury in a civil and/or criminal
case. Many of the cases reviewed in this article involve litigation that has not yet pro-
ceeded to a final resolution of claims. For simplicity, the article often refers to the plain-
tiffs in these cases as "sexual assault victims" or "victims," although many of these
plaintiffs can be referred to as "alleged victims." Similarly, at times the article generically
refers to defendants in these cases as "assailants" or "rapists," regardless of whether a jury
has determined that the particular defendant has committed assault or whether the case is
still at a more preliminary stage.
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since the Kobe Bryant case-to what extent can and should victims use
tort actions as a direct alternative to the criminal process? 8 As judged by
the appellate case law, tort actions can be and have been pursued as an
alternative to criminal fora, though such use of the tort system is still
atypical. Whether victims would be well advised to pursue tort actions as
a more commonplace alternative to the criminal process presents some-
thing of a mixed picture. Tort actions present a number of advantages for
victims proceeding against alleged assailants. These advantages include a
more even distribution of procedural benefits enjoyed by the parties and
a more fluid definition of the prohibited harmful conduct. And yet, tort
fora may serve an individual victim's interests without addressing broader
public objectives. In addition, tort doctrine, though different from crimi-
nal law in a number of ways that can benefit victims, still presents a signif-
icant set of concerns and challenges for victims. These challenges arise
through doctrines such as consent that have criminal law analogs and
through other doctrines such as comparative apportionment that do not
have direct criminal corollaries.
Finally, although the Kobe Bryant case itself concerned the use of tort
law by an alleged victim directly against an alleged rapist, the hundreds of
recent appellate opinions in tort suits filed by sexual assault victims more
frequently examine the legal liability of employers, businesses, schools,
nursing homes, foster parents, and other entities sometimes referred to as
"third parties." In light of the prevalence of third-party claims in the ap-
pellate litigation, this article examines a third question-in cases involv-
ing third parties, which substantive legal issues are the most recurrent and
important, warranting the attention of courts, legislatures, and the public
as a broader constituency? Ultimately, I identify four key issues that call
for further focused examination: 1) the extent and nature of corporate
and individual responsibility to use reasonable care to prevent sexual as-
sault; 2) the appropriate measure of damages to victims of sexual assault
and the division of responsibility for damages among assailants, victims,
and third parties; 3) the availability of compensation mechanisms such as
insurance to redress the losses suffered by victims of sexual assault; and
4) the protection of victim privacy within and through the civil process.
Although it is not possible to closely analyze each of these broad issues in
a single article, this article begins to lay the empirical groundwork for
further analysis.
In keeping with these threefold objectives, this article is organized into
three discrete sections. Section I provides information about recent ap-
pellate court rulings in tort suits that stem from rape and sexual assault.
The section notes changes in the case law over the last thirty to forty
years, and takes a particular look at cases in which tort actions are being
used as an alternative to criminal trials and convictions. It also identifies
some broad characteristics of current third-party litigation. Section II
looks at the potential procedural and substantive advantages to victims of
8. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 144 (1988).
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filing tort as opposed to criminal claims. This section notes also potential
obstacles that victims may encounter in the tort law. Finally, Section III
identifies important unresolved issues presented in the third-party case
law that warrant further thought and coordinated analysis by decision-
makers.
My goal in this article is to attend to the realities of current litigation by
sexual assault victims so that the many important issues that arise in these
tort cases will not only be litigated in the courts (as they clearly are), but
also discussed across jurisdictions and beyond the courthouse, and viewed
together for the wider forest that they have become.
I. CURRENT TORT CASES INVOLVING SEXUAL ASSAULT
Unlike distant inquiries such as exploration of the landscape on Mars,
examination of legal actions, filed and reported as they are in public fora,
would seem to hold no surprises.9 Yet so little research has been done on
the nature and outcomes of civil actions that stem from sexual assaul, that
the results are surprising.
As judged by state appellate court decisions, the number of civil cases
being litigated by sexual assault victims has increased dramatically, per-
haps exponentially, in the last thirty years. To attach some numbers to
these observations, in the five years from January 1, 2000 to December
31, 2004, state supreme courts by themselves issued rulings in more than
one hundred tort cases filed by rape and sexual assault victims. 10 In that
same time period, intermediate appellate court decisions in these cases
also numbered in the hundreds."' This is not counting the many federal
appellate court opinions issued in such cases. 12 By contrast, just thirty
9. John Schwartz, Rover Unearths More Evidence of Water on Mars, Scientists Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9, 2004, at A19 (noting excitement that research hinted at the past possi-
bility of water and life on that planet).
10. These cases are listed in Appendix A. Several commentators discuss "civil" cases
filed by sexual assault victims, in contrast to "criminal" cases. See, e.g., Quince Hopkins,
Mary Koss, & Karon J. Bachar, Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence:
Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 294 (2004) (mentioning "civil
justice" options for victims). Civil cases encompass a wide variety of disputes, including
adjudication of child custody, parental visitation rights, disciplinary sanctions, and other
issues. Rather than address all civil cases filed by sexual assault victims, this article focuses
on a subset of those cases-tort actions filed by sexual assault victims and the insurance
coverage disputes that arise from them. The border of claims that fall within this narrower
category is somewhat fluid. Not included in this category are the additional tort suits
brought by alleged assailants for claims like defamation or violation of due process rights.
See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054 (Mass. 2002);
Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2000). Similarly, cases brought by third
parties. for example newspapers seeking access to cotirt records, are generally excluded as
well. WLJA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383 (Va. 2002); Doe v. Gonzaga, 24 P.3d 390 (Wash.
2001) (en banc).
11. For a partial listing, see Appendix B.
12. See, e.g., Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. Fla. 2004) (holding
cruise ship liable for sexual assault of passenger perpetrated by cruise ship employee);
Kurtz v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 308, 65 Fed. Appx. 257, (10th Cir. 2003) (declining to hold
school district liable for negligent hiring after student was raped by teacher because risk of
the district employee sexually molesting the parent's minor son was not foreseeable as a
[Vol. 59
2006] Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies 59
years earlier, from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1974, state supreme
courts heard fewer than ten of these controversies 13 and intermediate
state appellate courts resolved fewer than ten more.' 4
In terms of sheer number of appeals, tort cases stemming from sexual
assault are in the ascendency. 15 Given the expectation that more than
95% of all cases settle before trial,16 and that most lower court judgments
are not appealed, 17 the great number of cases that are likely being filed at
the trial-court level becomes apparent.
This trend toward increased appellate-level tort litigation by sexual as-
sault victims in the United States is robust across regions. In the 2000 to
2004 case law, appellate courts in at least forty-seven of fifty states, as
well as the District of Columbia, issued opinions in tort cases filed by
sexual assault victims. 18 The data from Colorado, the state in which the
Kobe Bryant suit was filed, mirror national trends. Although a 1919 Col-
orado case recognized the existing right of a rape victim to file civil suit
against an assailant,' 9 a significant number of appeals did not begin to
appear at the appellate level in that state until the 1980s and 1990s.
20
matter of law); Beul v. Asse Int'l, 233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding international stu-
dent exchange program liable for negligence in performance of contract by failing to pre-
vent foreign exchange student's rape by her sponsor).
13. See generally Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1973); Seymour v.
Lofgreen, 495 P.2d 969 (Kan. 1972); Brewer v. Roosevelt Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647 (Me.
1972); Int'l Paper Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co, 35 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974); Bass v. New York, 32
N.Y.2d 894 (N.Y. 1973); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973); Schurk v.
Christensen, 497 P.2d 937 (Wash. 1972).
14. See generally Brown v. Rosenbloom, 524 P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Collier v.
AMI, Inc., 254 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Int'l Paper Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 348
N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Bass v. City of New York, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1972); Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Romisher
v. SEPTA, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 483 (Pa. Cty. 1974); Commercial Std. Ins. Co. v. Marin, 488
S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972).
15. The 1970s cases may underestimate cases of sexual assault because that term was
not as widely used at that time. However, a sampling of battery and assault cases from the
time suggests there were not a large number of sexual assault cases referred to by a differ-
ent title but rather genuinely fewer sexual assault cases litigated in the appellate courts.
16. See Haworth Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., No. 4:85 CV 526, 1992 WL 457284, at *5 (W.D.
Mich. 1992); Marc Galanter, The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258-59 n.15 (2005) (discussing research showing that the number
of trials is small and declining and that only 1.7% of disputes were resolved through trial in
2003); Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1503 (2003) (finding that 3% of cases proceed to trial).
17. See BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMEN-
TATION AND IMPACT 33 (2d ed. 1999) (suggesting that in federal courts only one-fifth of
trial court decisions are appealed).
18. See Appendix A & Appendix B.
19. Weinlich v. Coffee, 176 P. 210, 210-11 (Colo. 1919) (noting that a married woman
"may maintain an action to recover damages for injury sustained by reason of forcible
rape," but holding that the plaintiff, a married woman living apart from her husband, had
no cause of action for seduction).
20. See, e.g., In re Questions Submitted by United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, 759 P.2d 17, 26 (Colo. 1988) (holding that employee, who was raped by
janitor while walking on her employer's campus, could not pursue her negligence claims
against employer because her sole remedy for relief was under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act); Allstate Ins. v. Troelstrup, 768 P.2d 731, 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (en banc)
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Tort suits filed by victims of sexual assault are now litigated throughout
the country.
This increased litigation may reflect any number of changed social
norms. The change that can be seen most clearly by comparing the early
1970s and early twenty-first century case law is the broadening under-
standing of social responsibility for sexual assault prevention. Older
cases did not expect anyone but the assailant or the victim to prevent the
assault. Accordingly, cases filed by sexual assault victims and decided by
appellate courts in the 1960s were suits that were either directed at the
assailant himself,21 or were unsuccessful. 22 Although plaintiffs began ar-
guing for the expansion of responsibility (particularly public agents' and
entities' responsibility) in the 1960s, and early 1970s, courts were hesitant
to require parties other than the assailant or the victim to take prevent-
ative measures. 23
(remanding matter to trial court for jury determination of whether sexual assault was in-
tentional and therefore outside the scope of insurance coverage).
21. See Monsma v. Williams, 385 P.2d 107, 108, 111 (Alaska 1963) (upholding trial
court finding that man who allegedly sodomized plaintiff was not guilty of assault and
battery, in light of plaintiff's acquiescence in drinking and amorous affection that preceded
the act); Taylor v. Sullivan, 118 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. 1962) (reviewing case in which jury
ruled against plaintiff who sued physician for assault, battery and malpractice stemming
from alleged rape); Goode v. Martinis, 361 P.2d 941, 945 (Wash. 1961) (en banc) (permit-
ting divorced wife to sue husband for rape that husband allegedly committed before the
divorce); Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798-99 (Wis. 1965) (upholding $12,500 award in
assault and battery case brought by restaurant manager who was sexually assaulted at work
against assailant who was owner of a different restaurant).
22. See City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1965)
(holding that plaintiff raped by officer could not show that conduct was attributable to
city); State v. Markway, 353 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Mo. 1962) (holding that minor female pris-
oner who had sexual intercourse with jailer had no suit against jailer, bonding company or
sheriff based on evidence that she consented to intercourse); Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of
the City of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 270-99 (N.J. 1962) (holding that municipal housing au-
thority had no duty to provide police protection at housing project); Gallagher v. City of
New York, 30 A.D.2d 688, 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (reversing judgment against city and
city board of education secured by girl who was raped in school by classmates while on an
errand for teacher on the ground that evidence of prior incidents of violence at the school
were prejudicial, and that jury's $66,000 award was excessive). But see Danile v. Oak Park
Arms Hotel, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (upholding liability of hotel to guest
who had been raped by bellman who had been drinking and had taken plaintiff's room
pass key from a place whether other employees would have seen him, in part because of
high degree of care owed by innkeeper). A case that allowed recovery for the plaintiff, but
reflects the sexual and racial restrictions of the time more than a broad understanding of
responsibility for assault prevention is Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54 (Md. 1962). The
court allowed the plaintiff to maintain a defamation claim against an attorney who told a
newspaper that the black defendant accused of rape said that plaintiff, a white female, had
"submitted to his advances willingly." Id. at 56.
23. See generally Brewer v. Roosevelt Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647 (Me. 1972) (declin-
ing to find motel liable for sexual assault to motel guest when assailant entered through
motel window); Bass v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 894 (N.Y. 1973) (dismissing claims
brought by father of deceased victim against the City of New York for failing to provide
adequate police protection after nine-year-old daughter was abducted from housing pro-
ject where she lived, raped, and then dropped fourteen stories to her death). But see
Schurk v. Christensen, 497 P.2d 937 (Wash. 1972) (affirming defendant-parents' liability for
sexual assault of plaintiff's daughter after defendants recommended their son for babysit-
ting and son had a history of sexually deviant behavior).
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The 2000 to 2004 case law is markedly different. Many of the cases
from this later time period are concerned with institutional responsibility
to affect the conditions that make sexual assault prevalent and largely
unsanctioned. 24 At the appellate level, the vast majority of tort claims
filed by sexual assault victims involve at least some claims against a third-
party defendant. 25 Although assailants themselves may still be named as
defendants in the current cases, their responsibility is a far less frequent
focus of the inquiry. 26 Instead, current appellate-level tort litigation is
more frequently focused on the liability of third-party actors who would
not generally be subject to criminal penalties. Consequently, the change
in tort cases filed by sexual assault victims is not just an increase in the
amount of litigation, but an evolution in the very nature of the litigation
itself.
Doctrinally, the reasons for the shift toward a wider discussion of re-
sponsibility for sexual assault prevention are easy to see. Courts have
increasingly recognized third-party duties to use reasonable precaution
not only to prevent negligent harms, but also to prevent intentional
torts.2 7 For example, today nursing homes have an obligation to use rea-
sonable care to protect their patients from foreseeable sexual assaults, as
well as foreseeable slip-and-falls. 28 When a cable company ignores re-
ports that its employee is threatening customers, it does so at the risk of
potential liability if that abusive employee subsequently attacks another
customer in her home.2 9 Some of this expansion is simply a logical out-
growth of the more general foreseeability principle. Sexual assaults, like
slip-and-falls, do occur at nursing homes, making both of these events
foreseeable and the worthy focus of precaution.
The social influences fueling this expanded sense of the foreseeability
of sexual assault are potentially wide-ranging. Doctrinal expansion of the
tort law requiring private precautions against sexual assault and other
crimes occurred after a time period in which crime in the United States
began to increase dramatically,30 making crime both more foreseeable
and more imperative to combat. Expansion of national broadcasting me-
24. See S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 33 n.30 (quoting H. FIELD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND
RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 95 (1980) (stating that an individual who com-
mits rape has only about four chances in one hundred of being arrested, prosecuted, and
found guilty of any offense)).
25. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 50 (noting suits in which the victim settled with the assailant at an
earlier stage in the lawsuit).
27. See id.; see also Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 445-50
(1999); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern Amer-
ican Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 649-50 (1992). This broader sense of duty can been
seen in duty, negligence and proximate cause cases.
28. See, e.g., Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, 49
S.W.3d 107, 112 (Ark. 2001).
29. Saine v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 126 S.W.3d 339, 497 (Ark. 2003).
30. See Gary Lafree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 269, 270 (2000) (using uniform crime statistics to show that crime rapidly in-
creased in the 1960s and early 1970s, resulting in more than a 50% increase in homicides).
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dia including television may have made these stories more widely-
accessible.
The foreseeability of sexual assault in particular may have been fueled
by changes in gender roles and in sex-related norms. In terms of gender
roles, increased assertion of tort claims may reflect women's greater eco-
nomic and political power. In addition, the movement for rape law re-
form in the criminal arena may have influenced the public's awareness of
and feelings about the problem of sexual assault more broadly.3 1 In-
creased social acceptance of consensual sexual activity and greater discus-
sion of sexual topics more generally may play a role in the increased
litigation too. Sexual assault victims may be more willing to acknowledge
victimization publicly in light of decreased public sanctions against them,
such as marriage penalties against women who are not virgins32 and in-
creased social supports for victims, including the existence of rape crisis
centers and notable national role models. 33
The contemporary case law's intrinsic sense that private parties should
play a role in curtailing sexual assault may stem from additional factors.
In the sexual assault context, the passage of laws banning sexual harass-
ment and discrimination may have made sexual assault less acceptable
and institutions' role in preventing it more accepted.34 More broadly,
factors like the growth of retail operations to megastores and the expan-
sion of malls on private property rather than public downtowns may have
affected both the perceived propriety of and need for private policing.
Many other normative changes may be important as well. 35
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907
(1996) (arguing that norm entrepreneurs can take advantage of the fact that people have
weak commitments to most norms) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
32. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Sudan's Department of Gang Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2005, at A23 (exceptional stigma of rape in Sudan silences victims even as it terrorizes the
entire population); Emily Wax, Ethiopian Rape Victim Pits Law Against Culture, WASH.
POST, Jun. 7, 2004, at A01 (noting impossibility of bringing a rape case in the rural areas of
Africa where victim's virginity is questioned, unmarried victims are encouraged to marry
their assailants, and married women are abandoned by their husbands if raped).
For an example of traditional discomfort with public discussion of sexual topics, see
ALA. CODE § 12-21-9 (2005) (code enacted in 1907 giving the trial judge the right to clear
people out of the courtroom in civil cases involving the question of rape or issues involving
evidence that is vulgar, obscene, or tending to debase the morals of the young).
33. See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 58 (Pa. 1981) (noting in-
creased numbers of rape crisis centers); WILLIAM H. WEBSTER. DIRECTOR, FBI, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1979 (recounting increase in number of
crisis centers in 1970s, as well as one hundred percent increase in number of rapes); David
Heinzmann, Groups Seek New System to Help Treat Rape Victims; Experts Would Target
Emotional, Legal Needs, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 5, 2000, at 1D; Cynthia Bowers, Oprah
Takes on Child Molesters (CBS News Broadcast, Oct. 12, 2005) (recounting Oprah's disclo-
sure that she was raped at nine years old and molested for five years afterwards).
34. Sunstein, Social Norms, surpa note 31, at 907 (arguing that behavior is basically a
function of norms and that law can be used to change norms).
35. For example, in tort suits involving sexual assaults by spouses, the increased social
acceptance of divorce may be a factor in willingness to sue. See C. Quince Hopkins, Mary
P. Koss, & Karen J. Bachar, Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence:
Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 289 (2004) (noting high rates
of assaults against women that stem from family violence, particularly by partners). Simi-
larly, cultural attitudes about the appropriateness of lawsuits may be a factor.
[Vol. 59
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A number of these varied social changes can be seen in the case law
itself. For example, even forty years ago courts were unwilling to address
whether a victim who consented to foreplay had nevertheless refused
consent to intercourse. 36 Similarly, older case law did not feel compelled
to provide any explanation for why a $66,000 award to a thirteen-year-old
child who had been raped at school was excessive, while newer cases are
more protective of children 37 and, even when not, at least give lip service
to the perception that rape causes serious harm.38
Although one might expect changed social norms regarding culpability
of assault and appropriateness of private precautions to expand criminal
liability as well as tort liability, some studies suggest that the criminal law
has not changed significantly. 39 Perhaps this is because criminal sanctions
are viewed as too harsh a penalty for this expanded liability. 40 It would
be interesting to learn that advocacy directed at criminal law reform has
worked not by changing the criminal law at all (though formal statutes
have been rewritten), but instead by changing social norms and in turn
the law of torts, with a resultant change in structural incentives.
Whatever the reasons for the expansion in tort litigation filed by sexual
assault victims, today cases filed by victims include two types of viable
claims-claims against assailants themselves and claims against third par-
ties. Often, these two types of action are filed in a single lawsuit.
With respect to claims against assailants, one empirical question is
whether these claims are pursued as a substitute for the criminal process.
In the 2000 to 2004 state supreme court cases, tort actions filed by sexual
assault victims against alleged rapists-cases in which the civil law might
be thought to provide victims with a direct alternative to the criminal
courts-do exist but are relatively few in number. Nevertheless, exam-
ples of cases that appear to fit the criminal-law-substitute profile can be
found at both the state supreme court and state lower appellate court
level.
At times, victims have succeeded on tort claims when prosecutors were
unable to obtain criminal convictions. 41 For example, in one recent South
36. See Monsma v. Williams, 385 P.2d 107, 110 (Alaska 1963) (noting plaintiff's argu-
ment that with respect to the attempted rape "the court was wrong in deciding as a matter
of law that the plaintiff's actions created a consent to sexual intercourse and in then theo-
rizing that such consent could not be withdrawn" but upholding trial court's finding that a
man who allegedly sodomized plaintiff was not guilty of assault and battery, in part based
on plaintiff's acquiescence to drinking and amorous affection that preceded the act).
37. Compare Gallagher v. City of New York, 30 A.D.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968),
with Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545 (Haw. 2003) (providing much larger
compensatory damage award for teacher's assaults on students that fell far short of rape).
38. See Kravitz v. Beech Hosp., 808 A.2d 34, 41 (N.H. 2002).
39. See generally David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM . L. REV. 317
(2000).
40. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Solving the Sticky Norms Problem: Gentle Nudges v.
Hard Shoves, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) (suggesting that law is more effective in chang-
ing social norms when it takes smaller steps against existing social norms).
41. See also Jeffreys v. Griffin, 801 N.E.2d 404 (N.Y. 2003) (pursuing tort action after
physician's conviction was reversed on appeal and a retrial resulted in an acquittal).
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Dakota Supreme Court case, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. En-
gelmann,42 a woman alleged that she had been raped by her doctor while
he was ostensibly performing a pelvic exam. She contacted police, and
when her allegations became public, three other women came forward
with similar claims. The prosecutor charged the doctor with multiple
counts of rape, but a jury acquitted him of all charges. 43 In the subse-
quent tort action, the jury awarded each victim $450,000 in damages. 44
On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the doctor's im-
proper sexual contact constituted actionable "malpractice. '45 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs in Engelmann recovered on their tort claims despite
the fact that the prosecutor had not prevailed in a criminal trial.46
Victims have not only brought tort claims when criminal prosecution
was unsuccessful, but also when criminal prosecution was not pursued. A
tort case that apparently served this criminal-law-replacement function is
Weldon v. Rivera.47 In Weldon, the plaintiff complained that defendant
Gilbert Rivera had sexual intercourse with her in her dormitory room
after "she verbally objected to the act of intercourse," and "was so intoxi-
cated that she passed in and out of a state of consciousness. ' 48 She fur-
ther complained that co-defendant Edwin Touma, acted in concert with
Rivera by encouraging her to consume additional alcohol after she was
intoxicated and watching and kissing her during the act of intercourse
with Rivera. 49 The plaintiff sought damages for injuries caused by the
defendants' conduct.50
No prior or pending criminal proceedings resulting from the defend-
ants' conduct were cited in the court's opinion. 51 Proceeding in this civil
arena, defendant Rivera did not challenge whether he might be held lia-
ble based on the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. Moreover, both
the trial court and the appellate court held that plaintiff had stated a legal
claim under which defendant Touma might also be held liable. 52 The
plaintiff could proceed with her case on the theory of concerted action-
that "those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it. . . or who lend aid and encourage-
ment to the wrongdoer ... are equally liable with him."'53
42. 639 N.W.2d 192 (S.D. 2002).
43. Id. at 195.
44. Id. (awarding $50,000 damages each to the husbands of two plaintiffs).
45. Id. at 195-96.
46. Id. at 192.
47. 301 A.D.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
48. Id. at 934.
49. Id. at 935.
50. Id. at 934.
51. An independent search reveals a 1996 assault case against a defendant Gilbert
Rivera, People v. Rivera, 233 A.D.2d 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). It is not possible, how-
ever, to tell from the published opinions whether that case involves the same defendant
and/or plaintiff. Since 1990, no "Gilbert Rivera" has been committed to the New York
State Department of Corrections for a sex offense. See www.nycourts.gov/apps/chrs/.
52. Weldon, 301 A.D.2d 934, 934-35.
53. Id. at 935 (citing an earlier case that in turn had quoted WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
TORTS § 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971)). The appellate court did dismiss plaintiff's claims of
[Vol. 59
2006] Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies 65
That the plaintiff was permitted to against proceed with her claims
against not just the primary defendant but also an accomplice, in a case
involving acquaintances, a college student, and heavy alcohol use, sug-
gests that tort cases may be able to accommodate some of the cases that
have proved so difficult in the criminal forum.54
Cases like Engelmann and Weldon are not alone. In a number of re-
cent appellate court cases plaintiffs pursued tort claims against an assail-
ant as the sole defendant.5 5 Often these claims were filed against step-
fathers and other loosely-related relatives.5 6 However, these cases, while
suggestive of the potential for sexual assault victims to use tort actions as
an alternative to the criminal law, are not emblematic of broad current
usage. At least at the appellate level, only a small percentage of the tort
cases filed by sexual assault victims seem to fill this direct criminal-law-
substitute role. In many if not most tort cases, the assailant is sued along-
side other third-party defendants. 57 In a number of these actions, claims
against the assailant were resolved before trial and before resolution was
reached with third parties. 58 In a few tort cases, the assailant was not
sued at all.59 Moreover, even when tort actions were filed against assail-
recklessness and negligence on the ground that the state had no legal precedent for such
claims in this context. Id.
54. For difficulties of the criminal courts in addressing these cases see Commonwealth
v. Neumyer, 731 N.E.2d 1053, 1060 (Mass. 2000), in which the majority wrote "the fact that
the victim spent a night in the defendant's bedroom less than one week after reporting that
he had raped her must call into question the validity of the report of rape," despite the
defendant's confession to police and plea to criminal charges of assault and battery. See
also Charlene Allen, SJC Rape Case Ruling Hurts Women, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 17,
2000, at All.
55. See, e.g., L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2001) (step-granddaughter prevailing
in suit against step-grandfather based on childhood sexual abuse); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld,
781 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2001) (permitting son to sue adoptive father); Hearndon v. Graham,
767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000) (plaintiff suing stepfather); Koenigstein v. McKee, No. 2002-
CA-002212-MR, 2004 WL 41738 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2004) (parents suing daughter's un-
cle based on his sexual assault) (ordered not published, original on file with the author);
Bean v. Directions Unlimited, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 567, 570 n.5 (Mich. 2000); Frazier v.
Badger, 603 S.E.2d 587 (S.C. 2004) (teacher bringing action against assistant principal);
Palacios v. Robbins, No. 04-02-00388-CV, 2003 WL 21502371, at *2 (Tex. App. 2003) (wife
filed divorce action claiming sexual assault and fraud as well).
56. See supra note 55.
57. See, e.g., Blier v. Greene, 587 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (suit by counseling
patients against clinic and therapist); Velez v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238 (N.J. 2004)
(suit by city employee against city councilman and city); Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto,
811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002) (suit against boy scout troop leader, supervisor and Boy Scouts
of America).
58. See Kravitz v. Beech Hill Hosp., 808 A.2d 34, 30 (N.H. 2002) (noting that patient
settled case with other patient who allegedly assaulted her and proceeded with suit against
hospital); Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48, 51 (Vt. 2004) (noting that victim assaulted by deputy
originally sued deputy as well as sheriff, but "plaintiff voluntarily dismissed him from the
case because of his lack of assets"); Majorana v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 539
S.E.2d 426, 427 (Va. 2000) (noting that at first gas station attendant accused of sexual as-
sault was represented by counsel, but then he stopped cooperating with counsel and failed
to appear in proceedings, and a default judgment was entered against him, although the
case proceeded against gas station owner).
59. See Doe v. Baum, 72 S.W.3d 476, 478 (Ark. 2002) (examing case in which girl who
was sexually assaulted by eighth-grade boy on a school bus sued bus driver, school district
and others, but not assailant); Ashmore v. Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131, 1134 (La. Ct. App.
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ants directly, many of these tort suits were not filed instead of other
processes, but in addition to them. In a number of tort cases, the rapists
already had been jailed 60 or otherwise disciplined outside of the civil
context.
6 1
However, an important caveat is in order. Appellate cases may not
fully reflect the extent of litigation against assailants at the trial court
level. 62 In tort suits against the assailant, many defendants who would be
entitled to representation in the criminal process but not in the civil pro-
cess may enter into settlements early on or accept default judgments en-
tered against them. 6 3 As such, while the appellate records suggest that
civil litigation is not routinely used as a direct alternative to criminal liti-
gation-suing an alleged assailant in lieu of criminal prosecution-fur-
ther study at the lower-court level is necessary before satisfactory
conclusions can be drawn concerning the number of such actions at the
trial-court level.
Turning to the appellate-level cases filed by sexual assault victims
against third parties rather than assailants alone, the cases are as numer-
ous as they are varied. Third-party litigation seeks to obtain damages for
victims from the broader institutions within which sexual assaults occur.
The cases concern the responsibilities of schools, bus services, placement
agencies, boy scout leaders, foster parents, hospitals, and mental health
institutions. These cases also typically involve negligence, which is un-
likely to be sanctioned through the criminal-law process. A large number
of these tort cases stem from date or acquaintance rape.64 A notable, if
2002) (discussing case brought by girl, who was raped by inmate while performing commu-
nity service for city, and who sued city and supervisor but not inmate).
60. See Koenigstein, 2004 WL 41738 (showing a defendant who had been jailed);
Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 61 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (sheriff who went on a
crime spree and committed crimes including sexual assault was punished under criminal
law); Korhonen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 833 (Me. 2003) (noting that father had been
jailed for sexual assault); L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247,
251 (Mo. 2002) (noting finding in juvenile court that the defendant acquaintance had com-
mitted rape); Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823, 823 (R.I. 2000) (defendant convicted of
second-degree child molestation); Smith v. Holmes, No. 03-02-00438-CV, 2003 WL
1561321 (Tex. App. May 8, 2003, pet. denied) (stepfather had been jailed for sexual as-
sault); Forrest, 853 A.2d at 51 (noting that deputy had pleaded nolo contendere to charges
of lewd and lascivious behavior); T.M. v. Executive Risk Indem., Inc., 59 P.3d 721, 724 n.2
(Wyo. 2003) (noting conviction and jailing of foster parent on ten counts of second-degree
sexual assault).
61. See, e.g., Jeffreys v. Griffin, 801 N.E.2d 404, 410 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing impact on
tort claim of hearing in which doctor's medical license was revoked); N.X. v. Cabrini Med.
Ctr., 765 N.E.2d 844, 846 (N.Y. 2002) (noting that surgical resident who assaulted patient
while she was recovering from surgery was terminated from employment after investiga-
tion); Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 612 N.W.2d 600, 610-13 (S.D. 2000) (admitting evidence
in tort action that physician's application for re-issuance of medical license has been
denied).
62. Cf. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of
the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 757 (2004) (investigating the disparity be-
tween published appellate decisions in which civil claimants rarely win judgments against
police officers and newspaper reports of civil settlements by police departments).
63. See supra note _.
64. See, e.g., Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 773 A.2d 1045, 1047 (Me. 2001) (student
attending pre-season soccer program at university raped by a "young man" who walked
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not previously recognized facet of the third-party case law, is that a large
number of the cases also involve particularly vulnerable victims including
children, the permanently or temporarily disabled, and the infirm.65
The viability of third-party tort litigation is evident not only by the
large number of cases reaching appellate courts, but also by the wide vari-
ety of legal questions presented in the litigation. No longer are appellate
court cases exclusively focused on the threshold inquiry of whether a de-
fendant has a duty to use reas9nable care to take precautions against
crime. Rather, current case law reaches well beyond this first-level in-
quiry to issues of negligence, 6 6 actual cause,6 7 proximate cause, 68 dam-
ages,69 and insurance coverage70 among others, suggesting that these tort
cases are becoming more fully integrated into the overall patterns of tort
litigation.
II. TORT ACTIONS AGAINST ASSAILANTS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE CRIMINAL LAW:
PROMISE AND PERILS FOR VICTIMS
Obstacles to the use of criminal law to prevent unwanted sex have been
well documented. As Steven Schulhofer writes with respect to the crimi-
nal process, even after "decades of intense scrutiny and repeated at-
tempts at ambitious reform, our laws against rape and sexual harassment
still fail to protect women from sexual abuse and overreaching. ' 7 1 A lit-
any of evidence supports this conclusion. A minute fraction of rape cases
result in prosecution.7 2 Even fewer result in conviction. 73 And criminal
law reforms seem not to have meaningfully affected these results.74 The
her to the dorm); Kravitz v. Beech Hill Hosp., 808 A.2d 34, 37 (N.H. 2002) (resident of
rehabilitation facility assaulted other resident); Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Ctr.,
Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 908 (Utah 2003) (one foster child assaulting another).
65. See, e.g., Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, 63 P.3d 1009, 1011 (Alaska 2003) (show-
ing assaults on developmentally disabled woman who suffered from cerebral palsy); Re-
gions Bank & Trust v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, 49 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Ark.
2001) (showing semi-comatose quadriplegic patient who was assaulted); Doe v. Baum, 72
S.W.3d 476 (Ark. 2002) (assault on third-grader); Jeffreys v. Griffin, 801 N.E.2d 404, 478-79
(N.Y. 2003) (showing assault on woman under anesthesia).
66. See, e.g., Kennedy v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 857 So. 2d 71, 73 (Ala. 2003); Goins v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 800 So. 2d 783, 785 (La. 2001) (granting summary judgment on the basis
that plaintiff had not demonstrated breach of duty by store security guards who learned
that men fixing car in store parking lot had previously been arrested but did not pat them
down or continue to observe them).
67. See, e.g., Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001).
68. See, e.g., Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2003).
69. See, e.g., Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 2003).
70. See, e.g., Korhonen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 833 (Me. 2003).
71. STEVEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX iX (1998).
72. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1244-52 (1997).
73. See id. at 1251. These percentages may not be particular to rape; see Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30 n.1
(2002) (noting the tiny percentage of federal and state convictions that stem from criminal
cases more generally).
74. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 71, at 38-40; see also David P. Bryden, Redefining
Rape, 3 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320 (2000) ("a growing body of social-scientific evidence
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difficulties relate not only to implementation of criminal law restrictions,
but to core legal prohibitions themselves. As Schulhofer demonstrates,
the criminal law, even as written, is inadequate to the task of protecting
autonomous choice about sexual intimacy.75
A. THE PROMISE OF TORT LAW FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS
Against this backdrop of failed criminal process, it is logical to think
that victims might look elsewhere for a more congenial and effective fo-
rum. Ever since the mass media coverage of the O.J. Simpson criminal
and civil cases, the general public has been aware that a person who com-
mits a crime can be held liable in a civil court even after being found not
guilty in a criminal trial.76 Sexual assault victims can file civil suit against
attackers when the government is unable or unwilling to prosecute a
criminal case or when the prosecutor does not prevail in proving the
charges-as illustrated by the examples in Section I-or when the victim
does not want to deal with government representatives. Some view this
alternative use of tort actions as particularly sensible in the case of date
or acquaintance rape, where prosecution is less likely. 77
Although only a small percentage of current appellate court cases fit
this alternative-use profile, there is reason to think that tort suits could be
used in this way more routinely. Certainly, tort suits offer some signifi-
cant procedural, practical, and doctrinal advantages for victims. One
commonly-noted procedural distinction between the fora is the difference
in the burdens of proof required.78 In criminal cases the prosecutor must
establish "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." In civil actions, by
contrast, the plaintiff need only show a "preponderance of the evi-
dence."' 79 Such differential burdens can be significant, as courts them-
selves recognize.80 Not only can torts suits be filed after criminal
indicates that, contrary to reformers' expectations, the much-heralded evidentiary reforms
have had little impact on reporting, processing, and conviction rates in rape cases").
75. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 71.
76. Linda Greenhouse, 47% in Poll View Legal System as Unfair to Poor and Minori-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1999, at A12 (reporting American Bar Association survey that
found that "a surprising 96 percent [of people polled] knew that a criminal defendant who
is found not guilty can still be sued in a civil trial"and attributing that information to the
O.J. Simpson trial).
77. See WARSHAW, supra note 8, at 144.
78. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 841
(1993) ("An important advantage of this route is that the 'reasonable doubt' standard of
criminal law need not be met, and recovery can occur under the civil law's more lenient
'preponderance of the evidence' standard"); Holly J. Manley, Civil Compensation for the
Victim of Rape, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 193, 199 (1990).
79. Ashmore v. Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131,1134 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that because
evidence from the victim alone is sufficient to prove rape in a criminal case, it is clearly
sufficient in a civil case, in which the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the
evidence).
80. In Doe v. Keller, 786 N.E.2d 422 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003), a man who had been raped
by his roommates sought a permanent protective order against his attackers, which the
court granted. Id. at 425. The roommates appealed on the ground that a grand jury had
heard the facts of the case and declined to indict them. Id. at 424. But the appellate court
wrote the following
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acquittals, 81 but at least one court held that treating a criminal acquittal
as though it proved innocence was itself negligent. 82
In addition to the lower burden of proof, tort actions provide a number
of additional procedural advantages for victims. Unlike the criminal law,
tort procedural protections are not weighted toward the defendant. In
tort cases, the constitutional rights of defendants are rarely at issue. Con-
sequently, the frequent due process challenges that arise in the criminal
context, 83 make only rare appearances in the tort law. 84 Similarly, in the
tort context unlike the criminal context, a victim can seek to discover and
compel the defendant's testimony, or draw adverse inferences from the
defendant's refusal to provide it.85 Moreover, unlike criminal cases in
which the defendant is represented by counsel and the plaintiff is not, the
defendant in a tort action has no right to free legal representation. 86
While these differences may raise concerns that tort law procedural pro-
tections are too limited, the procedures nevertheless place plaintiffs and
[W]e find no merit in the defendant's claim with respect to the grand jury's
failure to indict them. The question before the grand jury was whether there
was probable cause to believe that [the roommates] had raped the plaintiff.
The question before the district judge was whether, based upon a preponder-
ance of the evidence, there was a continuing need for a restraining order
under the [Massachusetts statute]. Different questions may result, as they
did here, in different answers.
Id. at 425. In the tort context, see Dean v. Raplee, 39 N.E. 952, 954 (N.Y. 1895) ("If this
was a criminal case, where the prosecution is bound to prove the charge 'beyond a reasona-
ble doubt,' the appeal would be entitled to prevail. But here [in a tort action] a preponder-
ance of proof is sufficient").
81. Smith v. Welch, 967 P.2d 727, 733 (Kan. 1998) (noting that civil action is not
merged into criminal action).
82. Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 594 (Haw. 2003) (noting that the
Department of Education which employed the teacher-pedophile who assaulted plaintiff
"naively assumed, apparently without consulting its legal advisors, that [the teacher's pre-
vious] acquittal signified that a jury had determined that he was innocent beyond a reason-
able doubt," that assumption was unreasonable, and the school's reinstatement of the
teacher without further inquiry or restrictions was negligent).
83. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1045 (R.I. 2004) (addressing adequacy of
instruction to the jury about criminal law requirements on due process grounds).
84. See, e.g., Murray v. Developmental Servs., 818 A.2d 302 (N.H. 2003) (addressing
evidentiary and trial practice issues under a standard affording discretion to the trial
court); Frazier v. Badger, 603 S.E.2d 587, 573 (S.C. 2004) (upholding punitive damages
award despite due process challenge).
85. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1999) (This Court has recognized
"the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered
against them," at least where refusal to waive the privilege does not lead "automatically
and without more to [the] imposition of sanctions.").
86. See generally Katja Cerovsek & Kathleen Kerr, Opening the Doors to Justice:
Overcoming the Problem of Inadequate Representation for the Indigent, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 697 (2004); Jeanie Costello, Who Has the Ear of the King? The Crisis in Legal
Services, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 655 (1990); cf. Vibert v. Bd. of Educ. of Reg'l Sch. Dist.
No. 10, 793 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Conn. 2002) (holding that school board had no duty to defend
teacher accused of sexual assault despite statute requiring defense and indemnification in
some circumstances). However, in one case a bankruptcy court ruled that the plaintiff's
case against a convicted assailant was stayed because the defendant lacked funds to defend
himself and no judgment was permitted to be levied against him because of the bank-
ruptcy. Doe Parents No. 1, 58 P.3d at 567.
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defendants on more equal footing. Given the absence of free legal repre-
sentation for alleged assailants in tort, it is not surprising to find that in
many current cases the plaintiff settled with the assailant before trial,
even when the case ultimately went to trial against third parties.87
Of particular procedural importance to victims who have pursued crim-
inal as well as tort cases, in some instances tort liability may be estab-
lished simply by noting a defendant's prior criminal conviction 88 or guilty
plea.8 9 In jurisdictions with collateral estoppel rules of this type, the
plaintiff need only try the question of damages to the jury.90 Even when
liability must be established in tort after a criminal conviction, in some
circumstances the jailed defendant may not be permitted to appear at the
trial.91 Civil use of other disciplinary findings is more complicated, but
possible. 92 There is, of course, a worry here that courts may, at times, be
too punitive toward unrepresented defendants.93
In substantive terms too, the tort law affords victims a number of ad-
vantages over the criminal law. Perhaps the most significant advantage is
that there is no tort of rape. An occasional state statute creates a civil
cause of action for sexual abuse. 94 However, this is the exception rather
87. See, e.g., H.R.B. v. Rigali, 18 S.W.3d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (in suit against
priest, archbishop, and diocese stemming from sexual assault at church-run school, plain-
tiffs settled claims against priest for $25,000 before trial, but proceeded to trial against the
others); M.C. v. N. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 1 P.3d 673, 674 (Alaska 2000) (supervisory employee
signed a confession of judgment assigning his rights to proceed against insurer on the con-
dition that plaintiff not pursue the judgment against him).
88. See Smith v. Holmes, No. 03-02-00438-CV, 2003 WL 1561321, at *2 (Tex. App.-
Austin May 8, 2003, pet. denied); Charles Delbridge, Case Note, Civil Procedure-The
Forest for the Trees: The Minnesota Supreme Court Considers the Collateral Estoppel Effect
of Criminal Convictions in Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Reed, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 555 (2004); see also Seedon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823 (R.I. 2000) (discussing victim's
rights statute which gives courts authority to enter conclusive civil judgments against con-
victed defendants if the victim wants this); Center for Law and Justice. University of Cin-
cinnati College of Law, In Favor of "Trina's Law:" A Proposal to Allow Crime Victims in
Ohio to Use the Criminal Convictions of the Perpetrators as Collateral Estoppel in Subse-
quent Civil Cases, 32 CAPITAL L. REV. 351 (2003).
89. See Koenigstein v. McKee, No. 2002-CA-002212-MR, 2004 WL 41738 (Ky. Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 2004) (holding that a defendant's guilty plea may have collateral estoppel
effect in a civil action) (ordered not published, original on file with the author); Brandon
Bortnor & Douglas Miller, Procedural Issues, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 968-69 (2003).
But see Clark v. Baines, 84 P.3d 245, 246 (Wash. 2004) (holding that Alford plea to assault
with sexual motivation did not have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent tort action).
90. Koenigstein, 2004 WL 41738, at *1.
91. See Smith, 2003 WL 1561321, at *2 (not permitting stepfather who had been jailed
for sexual assault to attend trial when the risk of transporting him from prison was high
and his criminal conviction and admissions "left no material issues of fact unresolved").
92. See Jeffreys v. Griffin, 801 N.E.2d 404, 407-10 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that factors for
applying collateral estoppel from doctor's license revocation hearing to tort claim were met
but that doctor should not have been precluded from contesting liability).
93. Occasionally the judgments seem to reflect a tendency to heap blame on those
already convicted. See Smith, 2003 WL 1561321, at *1 (entering an $18.5 million damage
judgment against a prisoner who was not permitted to be present at the trial).
94. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-1 (West 2005) (granting such a cause of action and
permitting attorneys fees to be recovered in these cases); Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch.,
845 A.2d 619, 627-30 (N.J. 2004) (applying New Jersey's child sexual abuse statute); see
also, L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 918 (Alaska 2001) (noting that step-grandfather had been
found civilly liable for "sexual abuse of a minor"). More typically, statutes that address
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than the rule. The absence of formal sexual abuse statutes does not mean
that sexual assault victims in most states have no tort claims. It simply
means that these parties must seek relief under more general causes of
action that proscribe intentional and negligent harm, such as battery,95
assault, 96 false imprisonment,9 7 outrage,98 seduction,99 violation of sec-
tion 1983,100 intentional infliction of emotional distress,' 0 ' invasion of pri-
vacy,10 2 negligent infliction of emotional distress, 10 3 and other negligent
sexual assault in the civil law concern either the appropriate statute of limitations for such
suits or evidentiary issues that arise in them. See, e.g., CAL. ANN. EvID. CODE § 1106
(West 2006) (precluding evidence of plaintiff's prior sexual conduct in sexual harassment,
sexual assault, excluding sexual battery cases); McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1172
(Wyo. 2001) (holding that based on express statute of limitations exception for "sexual
assault," action for sexual assault needed to be filed in four years, rather than under one-
year limit for assault and battery).
95. See, e.g., Jeffreys, 801 N.E.2d at 406.
96. See, e.g., id.
97. See, e.g., N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 151, 152 (Vt. 2001).
98. See, e.g., Smith v. Welch, 967 P.2d 727, 729 (Kan. 1998).
99. See, e.g., M.C. v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 1 P.3d 673, 674 (2000).
100. See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 917-19 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
officer's threats that woman would be jailed for forty years if she did not cooperate with
sting operation that required her to pose as a prostitute and offer oral sex was rape, which
constituted a serious battery and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, although qual-
ified immunity applied to this new legal interpretation); Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d
57, 75-76 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing § 1983 judgment against city that failed to disclose
negative employment information including an excessive force suit to subsequent employer
on the ground that the evidence did not show deliberate indifference to victims rights);
Billups v. Carter, 604 S.E.2d 414, 420 (Va. 2004) (reversing motions to dismiss § 1983
claims brought by prisoner who alleged sexual abuse by prison employee).
101. See, e.g., Nims v. Harrison, 768 So. 2d 1198, 1899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (hold-
ing that a high school teacher could maintain an action against students based on student
production and distribution of a newsletter laced with racial epithets that threatened to
rape and kill her and her children); Delk v. Columbia[HCA Healthcare Corp., 523 S.E.2d
826, 828-80 (Va. 2000) (holding that a psychiatric patient could maintain intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress action against facility that did not tell her that assailant had
exposed her to possible HIV infection and deprived her of the information she needed to
take precautions so as not to transmit it to her husband).
102. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003) (holding that unwel-
come sexual comments and touching did not constitute invasion of privacy tort).
103. See, e.g., Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 552-53 (Haw. 2003)
(permitting parents to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress without predi-
cate physical injury because trauma is self-evident to parents and child from a teacher's
molestation of child in school); Baca v. Falgoust, 760 So. 2d 1279, 1280-81 (La. Ct. App.
2000) (permitting woman who had been raped and forced to perform oral sex at gunpoint
to pursue negligent infliction of emotional distress claim when private investigator hired by
client's attorney with respect to rape case continually asked her to perform oral sex).
Often negligent infliction of emotional distress doctrines are tailored to physical injury
cases, not cases in which there is a duty to protect the plaintiff from emotional harm itself.
As such, in some cases, there is a disconnect between the doctrines of negligent interfer-
ence with emotional distress tort and the realities of emotional distress in sexual assault
cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. 2001) (asking
whether sexual assault victim, whose picture may have been posted in store as a shoplifter,
was "in the zone of physical danger" and concluding that the taking of a photograph did
not involve physical danger). Often, when courts apply stilted rules in the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress cases, victims would be better served to assert other causes of
action such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and in Brown, perhaps,
defamation.
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torts like malpractice 0 4 and in third party cases claims like negligent hir-
ing.' 05 Although not discussed at length in this piece, sometimes statu-
tory claims 10 6 or contract claims are also at issue.10 7
This ability to sue under more general causes of action appears to be
one of the most significant advantages that victims enjoy in tort as op-
posed to criminal fora. A brief review of criminal cases decided by state
appellate courts in the 2000 to 2004 time period suggests that criminal
sexual assault statutes are very specifically written and rigidly applied.' 08
In criminal cases, prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed each specific statutory provision with the re-
quired intentional state.10 9 Thus in some cases, the prosecutor must
prove not only that the defendant sexually assaulted the plaintiff but that
the assault was also for the purpose of sexual gratification.' 10 Similarly,
criminal law cases necessarily delve into insufferable details about exactly
which digit touched which orifice in order to establish that a particular
offense has been committed."' This sort of detailed focus on minute in-
tricacies of sexual interactions stands in sharp contrast to the more fluid
tort law. In battery, for example, a plaintiff need only show that she was
harmed or offended by contact and that the defendant intended the con-
tact to harm or offend. 112 Thus the law of battery has been held to bar
not only punches and kicks but even such slight offenses as cigarette
smoke blown in another's face with an intent to offend. 113
104. See, e.g., Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 833 (Ala. 2002) (holding that "where the
alleged sexual misconduct occurs as part of a physician's examination and/or treatment of
the patient, the conduct is considered to have occurred during the delivery of professional
services, and is therefore cognizable as a medical-malpractice claim); Martinmaas v. Engel-
mann, 612 N.W.2d 600, 603 (S.D. 2000). But see Blier v. Greene, 587 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that, given the facts, a plaintiffs claim of sexual assault and battery
against a clinic therapist did not involve the exercise of professional judgment, which is
required for a professional or medical malpractice claim).
105. See, e.g., Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 539 S.E.2d 426, 427 (Va.
2000).
106. See, e.g., Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823, 824 (R.I. 2000) (victim's rights statute
that allowed victims to receive automatic compensatory verdicts but did not permit assess-
ment of punitive damages).
107. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Mo.
2002) (asserting that the victim was a beneficiary of a mall security contract); Univ. of S.
Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 171 (Miss. 2004) (permitting question of breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing to go to jury based on professor's sexual assault of doctoral
candidate).
108. See State v. Flynn, 855 A.2d 1254, 1261-63 (N.H. 2004) (addressing particular re-
quirements of several different sexual assault statutes); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1
(Tenn. 2004) (interpreting statute prohibiting abuse of position of trust not to apply to
physician who assaulted 17 year-old).
109. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1045 (R.I. 2004) ("the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution denies the state the
power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the state proves every element necessary to
constitute the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt").
110. Id.
111. See State v. Flynn, 855 A.2d 1254, 1261-63 (N.H. 2004) (discussing at length
whether defendant's specific sexual acts amounted to cunnilingus and digital penetration).
112. See Hall v. McBryde, 919 P.2d 910, 914 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
113. Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ohio 1994).
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Traditional staples of the criminal law rape case, such as penetration,
are simply not required in tort. And unlike the criminal law, no victim
need show that a finger touched an unwanted place inside her vagina
rather than outside her vagina in order to recover. 114 Similarly, the ele-
ment of force is irrelevant as long as the victim can prove the defendant
had an actual intent to harm or offend. Consequently, some of the doctri-
nal hurdles for the victim to surmount in tort actions may be less cumber-
some than those found in the criminal law.115
There is a risk that new statutes designed to aid sexual assault victims
will import existing criminal-law problems into civil cases. For example, a
New Jersey statute that creates a specific civil action for sexual abuse
defines "sexual contact" to include touching "the victim's or the actor's
intimate parts for the purpose of sexually arousing or sexually gratifying
the actor. ' 116 This type of specific language would make defining intimate
parts and introducing evidence of sexual gratification, among other top-
ics, necessary issues of litigation in the civil context, as well as the crimi-
nal context. But as the common law stands without these statutory
interventions, no such queries are important.
Using general causes of action like battery, state courts have reached a
number of progressive results in rape cases. For example, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court permitted a woman to pursue a tort action against her
husband for a rape that took place during the marriage 17 even though
Washington's criminal statute was not amended to prohibit marital rape
until more than a decade later.118
Perhaps more important than even procedural and substantive advan-
tages, civil actions present a number of practical advantages for victims.
Because tort actions are filed by the victim herself, not on behalf of the
state, victims control the decisions attendant to litigation, including when
and whether to settle or dismiss a case. As such, victims can shape the
litigation to meet their personal objectives. Tort litigation may be filed
against defendants to obtain monetary damages. Although liability insur-
ance is generally unavailable to pay for assailants' intentional torts,11 9
some assailants will have the assets and income from which to pay a judg-
114. Cf. State v. Flynn, 855 A.2d 1254, 1260-63 (N.H. 2004) (discussing the importance
of this fact and evidence related to it in a criminal case).
115. See supra note 79.
116. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-1(2) (West 2005).
117. See Goode v. Martinis, 361 P.2d 941, 945 (Wash. 1961).
118. See State v. Bowen, 531 P.2d 837, 840 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). A tort action can
be filed based on marital rape in other states as well. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cheryl
Peters, 765 A.2d 468, 474 (Vt. 2000) ("We reject entirely the notion that marriage creates
any kind of implied 'blanket consent to sexual contact."'). Parents can also be sued for
intentional torts when they sexually abuse children. See Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 781 So. 2d
1070, 1071 (Fla. 2001) (permitting son to sue adoptive father; parental immunity did not
apply).
119. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 135-37
(2001) (noting the lack of insurance and asset availability for tort claims filed by victims of
domestic violence and arguing for mandatory insurance coverage).
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ment or settlement, either directly or through garnished wages. 120 Tort
judgments against a spouse can also advantage the plaintiff when courts
determine the distribution of marital assets during divorce
proceedings. 121
But even in the many cases in which victims cannot expect to recover
monetary damages, tort suits can aid victims in obtaining non-monetary
objectives such as an apology 122 or the assailant's transfer to a different
university, apartment complex, or job.123 These litigation objectives may
be easier to achieve in tort law because the victim can directly bargain to
drop her suit in return for the defendant's promise to meet her inter-
ests-the main function of settlement negotiations. This stands in
marked contrast to the criminal context, in which it is generally consid-
ered unethical for a victim's attorney to suggest to the defense counsel
directly that the victim drop criminal charges in return for the assailant's
satisfaction of particular victim demands. 124
One case that highlights the potential benefits of civil litigation for vic-
tims is Collins v. Carpenter.125 In that case, a mother brought suit against
the man who allegedly molested and raped her minor daughter, who had
learning disabilities.' 26 During the pendency of the litigation, the mother
filed a motion for prejudgment attachment, which was granted by the
court. 127 As a result, the defendant was ordered not to sell his house.
When the defendant nevertheless sold the house in violation of court or-
der, the mother filed a fraudulent conveyance action against the home
purchaser. An Ohio appellate court determined that the purchasers had
constructive notice of the prejudgment attachment filed in the county re-
corder's office and therefore allowed the mother's fraudulent conveyance
action to proceed. 128 The mother later prevailed on this claim.' 29
120. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Engelmann, 639 N.W.2d 192, 201 (S.D.
2002); R.W. v. Schrein, 642 N.W.2d 505, 517 (Neb. 2002).
121. See htpp://www.neveragainfoundation.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
122. Hopkins, Koss & Bachar, supra note 10, at 291.
123. VicTIM RIGHTS LAW CENTER, VIcrIM HANDBOOK.
124. Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An Impassioned Exploration for
Family Peace, 33 FAM. L.Q. 719, 742 (1999); Jeffrey A. Ross, Ethical Issues Commonly
Faced by Plaintiffs counsel in Sexual Harassment Cases, ABA CTR. FOR CLE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE (1998) (noting that lawyer who offers to refrain from filing charges or agrees to
drop charges in exchange for an acceptable settlement may "expose the attorney to charges
of unethical conduct" as well as criminal charges including extortion and blackmail); Wil-
liam H.J. Hubbard, Comment, Civil Settlement During Rape Prosecutions, 66 U. CH. L.
REV. 1231, 1250-60 (1999) (arguing that courts should apply bribery and witness tampering
laws to pretrial settlements that induce rape complainants to avoid trial). However, prose-
cutors themselves may trade off victim compensation for a reduction or dismissal of crimi-
nal charges. See Gabriel i. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 718-23 (2002).
125. No. 02CA31, 2002 WL 31161099 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2002).
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *3.
129. Collins v. Carpenter, No. 03-CA-99, 2004 WL 1047416 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28,
2004).
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Although the appellate court's decision in Collins focuses on the
mother's financial claim against the home purchasers (and presumably
their property title insurer), it is easy to imagine that the case could pro-
vide both monetary and non-monetary benefits to the victim. Without
need for the child victim to testify in court (the civil case was settled and
no mention was made of a criminal suit), the mother was able to use the
tort case to obtain financial remuneration for her daughter, to oust the
accused molester from his home, and to prevent him from selling the
house to people of his choice. 130 Thus the alleged attacker could not sim-
ply sell the house to a relative and continue to reside in it after the change
in ownership.1 31 Whether removing the alleged assailant from the neigh-
borhood was part of the motivation in Collins or not, the case makes
clear that under the civil law the victim and her family can, in some cases,
force an attacker to leave-a potentially significant benefit to some vic-
tims and their families.
B. PROBLEMS PERSIST FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS
PROCEEDING IN TORT
But the Collins case highlights not only the potential of viewing the tort
law as an alternative to the criminal action but also one of the chief con-
cerns in doing so. Although it might be good, indeed very good, for a
victimized disabled child to live in a neighborhood free of her attacker
and to obtain financial assistance to support her recovery, the civil rem-
edy does little or nothing to protect the children living near the attacker
after his change of address (or to protect this child from the assailant if he
finds another home nearby). Consequently, the tort option could protect
the child victim from future contact with her assailant and do so with less
obvious trauma to the child-an outcome of tremendous significance for
the individual child and family. However, from a public policy perspec-
tive, if the assailant is guilty of sexual assault, the tort action is less advan-
tageous than a successful criminal prosecution. Criminal conviction could
protect the public at large through incarceration or monitoring of the as-
sailant. Thus, if criminal litigation would have been successful-if the
child, police, and prosecutors would have pursued the case and obtained
public remedies-using private litigation in lieu of criminal process could
leave the public in worse stead.
But whether tort litigation would be a second-best solution to the crim-
inal law depends on one crucial factor-what the criminal law would ac-
tually have done. In the vast number of criminal cases in which successful
prosecution is unlikely, perhaps as in Collins, pursing civil remedies adds
130. Id.; cf. Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 566 (Haw. 2003) (not
requiring child victims of sexual assault to testify in civil trial, as plaintiffs introduced tran-
scripts of testimony from defendant's criminal prosecution).
131. Cf. Andrew Pollack, 2 Illegal Immigrants Win Arizona Ranch in Court Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at Al (noting that shortly after a default judgment was entered
against rancher for harm to two border crossers, he gave his only substantial asset, his
ranch, to his sister).
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to the sanctions against victimization rather than detracting from them.
In those cases, civil actions would provide some public benefit or, at least,
private benefit without much corresponding diminution of public
interests. 132
Even when tort suits complement criminal processes in meeting public
objectives, however, tort actions present other procedural, practical, and
substantive hurdles for victims. In procedural terms, a tort case can take
five or more years to complete at the trial stage alone. 133 This long-term
litigation relationship with the defendant may be harmful to the victim's
emotional or physical well-being. 134 With respect to discovery, sexual as-
sault victims may be subject to less-invasive discovery, because the defen-
dant is not subject to incarceration and the victim is being represented by
counsel. 135 On the opposite side, sexual assault victims may be subject to
broader discovery given the liberal discovery rules of the civil law and the
fact that the plaintiff voluntarily initiated the case. 136 While expert testi-
mony regarding typical behaviors of sexual assault victims may be admit-
ted in civil trials, 137 the application of rape shield laws in civil cases is an
important but unresolved issue in a number of states. 138 In some tort
litigation, the defendant may be able to use depositions and interrogato-
ries to harass or embarrass the plaintiff. For example, with respect to the
issue of damages, the defendant may be permitted to discover a number
of personal details about the victim's sexual relationships before and after
132. There might be some diminution of public interests in Collins when the assailant
moves away, because new neighbors will not have notice of the need to be aware of the
potential for assault in the way that the old neighbors presumably did after the incident.
133. See Dominica C. Anderson & Kathryn L. Martin, The Asbestos Litigation System
in the San Francisco Bay Area: A Paradigm of the National Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 45
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2004) (discussing California legislation that was enacted
"in response to a backlog of civil cases, many of which were taking five years to go to trial,"
and noting continuing problems with trial delays even after the legislation was passed).
134. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR
VICTIMs GRANT RECIPIENTS' POLICY GUIDEBOOK 6 (2002) (stating that endeavors such as
joint counseling may be a threat to the victim's safety and should not be pursued); Daniel
W. Shuman, Making the World a Better Place Through Tort Law?: Through the Therapeutic
Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 739, 756-57 (1993) (expressing concerns about
the effect of litigation delay on the victim's recovery).
135. Cf. Commonwealth v. Neumyer, 731 N.E.2d 1053, 1060 (Mass. 2000) (holding that
unrepresented victim's counseling records were allowed to be subpoenaed despite a shield
statute because of the defendant's significant interests in the records).
136. United States v. Degan, 517 U.S. 820, 825-26 (1996) (noting the broader discovery
available in civil rather than criminal actions); cf. Doe v. Briscoe, No. CL02-499, 2003 WL
22748373, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 24, 2003) (rejecting plaintiff's request to proceed pseu-
donymously on the ground that "it is the plaintiff herself who elected to initiate this ac-
tion ... these are serious charges and fairness dictates that the plaintiff stand behind them,
publicly").
137. L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 922 (Alaska 2001) (allowing expert testimony about
child sexual abuse to rebut defendant's claim that plaintiff fabricated abuse claim).
138. See Jackson v. Heard, 591 S.E.2d 487, 487-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (admitting evi-
dence that victim was at defendant's residence to provide sex for money because such
evidence "would diminish the possibility that she feared rape," and could "make it less
likely that [defendant] secretly slipped her a 'date rape' drug").
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the attack. 139
Perhaps the largest practical hurdle to direct litigation by the victim
against the attacker is access to legal services. As with all legal services,
most are prohibitively expensive to the majority of Americans. 140
Though many tort plaintiffs can obtain legal services on a contingency
basis, such representation is difficult to obtain when the expected finan-
cial recovery is slight, as would often be the case in lawsuits against the
alleged assailant directly. In addition, traditional legal service programs
have been unavailable to rape victims and public funding, such as legal
assistance to victim grants, currently may not be used to pursue tort
actions.141
Last, but certainly not least, victims may face a number of substantive
doctrinal hurdles similar or in addition to those they face in the criminal
courts. Specifically, thorny issues of consent remain in the civil context
and are intermingled with issues surrounding the defendant's subjective
intent to harm or offend. In addition, issues of damages and defenses
pose new hurdles for victims. Tort statutes of limitations for intentional
torts can be short, and defenses, such as contributory fault, that are
barred in criminal and tort cases alike, threaten to reenter tort law. 142
The case of consent provides a useful example of the shared difficulties
in criminal and civil case law. Like the troubling criminal law cases in
which courts ignore coercive conditions surrounding consent to sex, 143 in
tort law too, courts have at times disregarded even the most coercive of
circumstances. 144 The recent Indiana Supreme Court opinion, Robins v.
139. See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Utah 1989) (holding
that with respect to a woman who had been sexually assaulted by her therapist, defense
counsel's questions about whether victim's former husband ever kissed her and touched
her breast when they engaged in sex while married were appropriate because "the jury was
entitled to consider [plaintiff's] prior experience in assessing damages" and finding it "diffi-
cult to understand" why the plaintiff thought this evidence was improper).
140. David Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Klan, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1034 (1995) (addressing lawyers' respon-
sibilities in light of the problem of lack of access to legal services).
141. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL Assis-
TANCE FOR VICTIMS GRANT PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 2003 SOLICITATION 3 ("Grant funds
can not be used to support legal representation in the following areas: ft]ort cases, [cihild
sexual abuse cases, [c]ases involving the child protective services, [v]ictim service employee
cases"); see also, Lois H. Kanter, Invisible Clients Exploring Our Failure to Provide Civil
Legal Services to Rape Victims, 38 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 254 (2005) (discussing the reality
that "traditional legal services programs, law school clinics, and bar association pro bono
projects have never served rape victims").
142. There is some academic argument about whether contributory negligence argu-
ments do and should reenter the criminal law as well. See generally Vera Bergelson, Vic-
tims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. L.
REV. 385 (2005).
143. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rape in the Twilight Zone: When Sex is Unwanted But Not
Illegal, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 416-17 (discussing People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
144. See, e.g., State v. Markway, 353 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1962) (holding that minor female
prisoner who had sexual intercourse with jailer had no suit against jailer, bonding com-
pany, or sheriff based on evidence that she consented to intercourse).
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Harris,1 4 5 is illustrative. In Robins, a female county jail inmate charged
that she had been sexually assaulted by a deputy at the jail. In a criminal
action against him, the deputy admitted to sexual contact and pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor official misconduct. 146 In a tort suit stemming
from the same conduct, the deputy argued that the inmate consented to
sex. The state appellate court ruled that the consent defense should have
been barred. 47 Although the case was settled before review, the Indiana
Supreme Court nevertheless chose to affirm the appellate court's decision
"except as to the availability of consent as a defense to the claim of bat-
tery," leaving open the possibility that a jailer might raise the inmate's
consent to sex as a defense in future cases.1 48
In dissent, Justice Sullivan argued that the appellate court had been
correct-consent should not furnish a defense where a detainee is in-
volved.149 In support of this assertion, the dissent invoked the court of
appeals' public policy argument: Indiana law does not permit consent to
serve as a defense to a criminal sexual assault claim involving a detainee.
"Given [the plaintiff's] general lack of autonomy as an inmate, it would
be incongruous to withhold the defense of consent in the criminal con-
text, but to allow [the jailer] the defense in a civil claim.' 150 In light of
the coercive conditions of the detention, the dissent argued that public
policy precluded the defense in both criminal and civil cases. Since these
arguments were made in dissent, they demonstrate that, at least with re-
spect to the issue of consent, in some cases Indiana sexual assault victims
are no better off, and may be worse off, proceeding in Indiana's civil
rather than criminal courts.
It is easy to argue that the Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning violates
ordinary tort principles. Power inequalities and duress have long been
recognized as forces that obviate consent in the tort law. 151 Nevertheless,
the Robins case makes clear that consent is an issue to be reckoned with
in tort cases based on sexual assault, just as it is with respect to criminal
suits.
In fact, at times the consent issue has taken troubling turns in tort law
that would not have been possible in the criminal law. Specifically, in one
recent New Hampshire Supreme Court case, Kravitz v. Beech Hospital, 52
the existence of consent was determined not by a review of the testimony
and evidence in the case but rather based on the jury's findings with re-
spect to apportionment and damages. In Kravitz, a fourteen-year-old girl
who was being treated at a drug and alcohol treatment facility alleged
145. 769 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. 2002).
146. Id. at 587.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 587-88 (Sullivan, J. dissenting)
150. Id. at 588 (Sullivan, J. dissenting).
151. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 236-41 (examining circumstances
in which consent obtained by abuse of power or position might be deemed ineffective as a
matter of policy).
152. 808 A.2d 34 (N.H. 2002).
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that she had been raped by an eighteen-year-old convicted sex offender
staying in the same facility.153 "[T]he central question at trial was
whether the sexual activity was consensual."' 154 The girl testified that the
sexual activity was not consensual. It is not clear from the opinion
whether the eighteen-year-old defendant testified with respect to the is-
sue of consent at all. However, his liability was established through a
default judgment. After a ten-day trial the jury completed a verdict form
finding both the alleged rapist and the drug treatment facility liable.155
Despite this finding of liability, the jury, which had been allowed to hear
evidence of the girl's prior consensual sexual contact with three Jamaican
men despite a pretrial motion to the contrary, assigned $130 damages to
the victim, 156 which the trial court then reduced to zero. 157 The jury also
awarded $13,672 in damages to the mother-reimbursement for the
daughter's stay at the treatment facility. Between the liable defendants,
the jury apportioned one hundred percent of the fault for the assault to
the treatment facility that had given the prior sex offender access to the
girl.
On appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the court agreed
that "no party disputes that it is unreasonable for a jury to find that a
fourteen-year-old child had been raped, but award her zero damages."' 58
However, rather than use this concern as a reason to remand for a new
trial on the issue of damages 159 or for a new trial based on conflicting
liability and damage verdicts, the appellate court held as a matter of law
that the girl had not been raped. According to the court, despite the find-
ing of liability, "the jury had not found that non-consensual sexual con-
duct had occurred." 160 Thus the court used the extremely low damage
award and assignment of institutional fault to conclude that "the sexual
activity had been 'volitional on the part of both parties."'1 61
Although it might seem rational for the court to assume that if a rape
had occurred, the jury would have assigned the rapist the lion's share or
at least some of the fault, jury comparative apportionment decisions belie
that assumption. Even in cases in which the defendant was guilty of ex-
treme fault, as in an apparently premeditated homicide, a jury awarded
only 25% of the fault to the murderer himself and assigned the remaining
75% of the fault to the negligent 911 operator who misclassified the
153. Id. at 37-38.
154. Id. at 38.
155. Id. at 37-38.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 38. The trial court's theory was that the jury could have reasonably con-
cluded that damages had not been established.
158. Id. at 41.
159. See A.R.B. v. Elkin, 98 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (appellate court re-
manded case for new damages determination when trial court found sexual abuse against
children but awarded no damages to female victim and only $100 damages to male victim).
160. Kravitz, 808 A.2d at 42.
161. Id. at 42-43.
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plaintiff's emergency call as a non-priority call. 162 As such, low percent-
ages of fault assigned to the intentional tortfeasor may have a number of
meanings besides no wrongful conduct by the tortfeasor, including a
greater likelihood that appropriate conduct by the negligent-tortfeasor
would have averted the harm.
In reaching the conclusion that the jury's apportionment necessarily re-
flected the plaintiff's consent to the sexual conduct despite the jury's
finding of liability, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, not generally
considered a finder of fact, determined that the girl had consented to sex-
ual contact-not based on consideration of the evidence in the case-the
girl's testimony, the assailant's testimony, or the testimony of anyone else
present during or after the incident-but based on its opinion of the
jury's inadequate damage award. 163 While the court's conclusion is as
surprising as it is unusual, the case highlights the difficulty that the con-
sent issue can pose in tort law, even when the jury concludes that the
elements of the tort case have been met.
Problems of consent in the civil context, can present themselves not
only as consent issues per se, but also as problems for the plaintiff in
proving the defendant's subjective intent to harm or offend (one of the
prima facie elements of the battery case). In battery cases involving sex-
ual relationships, the question of consent is related to the intent ques-
tion-did the defendant intend to commit a harmful or offensive
touching? Even if a reasonable person would not have thought that the
plaintiff was consenting to sexual contact-the standard for consent 164-
if the defendant himself actually but unreasonably believed that the
plaintiff was consenting, many though not all state courts would not hold
the defendant liable in tort.165 To use tort law to prevent physical contact
162. See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 444, 451-52 (Ariz. 1998); see also Ellen
M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and Intentional
Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 385 n.131 (2003) (citing cases in which the negligent
party was assigned more of the fault than the intentional tortfeasor) [hereinafter Bublick,
The End Game].
163. Kravitz, 808 A.2d at 42. The court's conclusion may also have relied on an im-
proper attorney affidavit that the court said should not have been considered.
164. See supra note 140, § 596 at 218 (noting that "either actual or apparent consent is
effective to relieve the actor of responsibility").
165. Thus, if defendant argued that while a reasonable person would have realized that
the plaintiff was not consenting to sexual contact, he did not, if the jury believed him, in
many jurisdictions his conduct would not constitute battery (as battery often requires a
subjective intent to harm or offend). See White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 817 (Colo. 2000)
(discussing the dual intent standard as well as jurisdictions that do not require it). But see
Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 603 (Utah 2005) (insisting that the only intent required in
battery is intent to make bodily contact, though harm or offense must result in fact); Jef-
freys v. Griffin,801 N.E.2d 404, 408 n.2 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting pattern jury instructions that
read "intent required for battery is intent to cause a bodily contact that a reasonable per-
son would find offensive"); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). Requiring this more
limited intent in battery cases could extend victims' recovery in battery cases but could also
obliterate the distinguishing features of intentional and negligent torts. See RESTATEMENT
[THIRD] OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS § 1 (2005) (requiring subjective in-
tent to harm or offend for intentional torts). The problem of rape when a reasonable
person would understand that the victim was not consenting but the defendant did not has
been discussed in the criminal forum. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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that a reasonable person would have recognized as harmful, offensive, or
nonconsensual, state courts or legislatures would need to create legal
rules proscribing intentional touchings that are reckless or negligent with
respect to harm or offense to the person touched. These rules currently
do not exist in many jurisdictions. 166
Consent and the related issue of a defendant's subjective intent are not
the only substantive areas of tort law that present challenges to sexual
assault victims. Even once the assault is proved, courts have questioned
whether sexual assault victims have actually suffered damages. Although
in a few cases high punitive damages have been assessed against an assail-
ant, 167 other courts or juries awarded no damages at all. 168
A number of defenses may also impede victim recovery. For example,
in the tort context, it has been held that a doctor who assaults his patients
may be entitled to take advantage of a tort reform statute for medical
malpractice, even though the plaintiff has pleaded an intentional tort
rather than malpractice itself.169
Similarly, statutes of limitation have been a barrier to some victim
166. See Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, 63 P.3d 1009, 1015 (Alaska 2003) (rejecting
defendants' request to instruct on negligence or recklessness on the ground that if the jury
had found the defendants liable "for anything less than an intentional touching, they would
not have been liable for assault"); Weldon v. Rivera, 301 A.D.2d 934, 935 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (holding that there is no precedent under New York law for a tort of negligence or
recklessness in the context of rape). But see Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 612 N.W.2d 600,
603 (S.D. 2000) (holding that rape by doctor in the course of an examination constituted
"malpractice," a tort that sounds in negligence). Cf. Ian Ayres & Katherine K. Baker, A
Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 599 (2005) (proposing a crime of reck-
less sex, in part to stem acquaintance rape and in part to stem sexually transmitted
disease).
167. See Smith v. Holmes, No. 03-02-00438-CV, 2003 WL 1561321, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Austin May 8, 2003, pet. denied) (rendering an $18.5 million default judgment against
jailed stepfather).
168. In A.R.B. v. Elkin, 98 S.W.3d 99 (Mo. App. 2003), for example, a son and daughter
sued their father for assault and battery stemming from sexual abuse. Although the trial
judge found the father liable, the court awarded only nominal damages to the son and no
damages to the daughter who, in the court's judgment, had not been physically harmed.
Id. at 103. On appeal, the court held that at a minimum, both plaintiffs should have been
awarded nominal damages. In addition, the appellate court held that the trial court should
have considered awarding additional compensatory damages for pain, humiliation, and
mental anguish, and possibly even punitive damages. Id. at 104-05; see also Kravitz v.
Beech Hosp., 808 A.2d 34, 42 (N.H. 2002) (examining jury finding of third-party liability
based on sexual assault in which the jury assigned victim zero damages); Doe v. N. Panola
Sch. Dist., 906 So. 2d 57, 62 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (finding insufficient evidence to support
pain and suffering damages to moderately retarded student who could not communicate
clearly the level of stress she suffered as a result of rape).
169. See, e.g., Mock v. Allen, 783 So.2d 828, 832 (Ala. 2000) ("Although the AMLA
applies only to medical-malpractice actions, a plaintiff cannot avoid application of the
AMLA by 'creative pleading.' This Court has consistently held that it is the substance of
the action, rather than the form, that is the touchstone for determining whether an action is
actually one alleging medical malpractice."). But see Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 287-88
(Tex. 2004) (requiring that plaintiff, who alleged that neurologist placed his penis in her
hand, comply with Texas Medical Liability Act requirements with respect to claims against
medical clinic's other neurologists and co-owners, but not necessarily with respect to the
assaulting physician). By contrast, when professional liability insurance coverage is con-
cerned, courts often say that plaintiffs cannot use creative pleading to turn a sexual assault
claim into one for malpractice. See Ross v. Home Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 654 (N.H. 2001).
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suits. Statutes of limitation for intentional torts are often short, 170 though
they may afford children additional time to file a cause of action once
they reach the age of majority, 17' be lengthened by the discovery doc-
trine, 172 be tolled by fraudulent concealment of material facts, 173 or be
waived by defendants who fails to raise those defenses. 174 When short
statutes of limitation were applied in rigid fashion, at least one victim was
barred from filing suit against the attacker even when she learned the
attacker's identity belatedly through no fault of her own.
In Grimes v. Suzukawa,175 a Virginia Supreme Court case, the plaintiff
had been raped by a masked assailant who broke into her apartment. 176
The assailant could not be identified and evaded capture by the police for
over seven years. 177 When the assailant was later apprehended and con-
fessed to the crime, the plaintiff filed suit. In her civil suit, the victim
argued that the state's short statute of limitations should be tolled be-
cause she had no way to identify her assailant before he confessed his
crimes to police. Under the state's tolling provision, the statute of limita-
tions could be tolled when "the filing of an action is obstructed by the
defendant's ... (ii) using any ... direct or indirect means to obstruct the
filing of an action.' 78 Rather than conclude that the rapist had indirectly
obstructed the plaintiff's filing of an action by wearing a mask and fleeing
the scene of the crime, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to toll the
statute. According to that court's hyper-technical reading of the statute,
the rapist's "use of a mask was intended to conceal his identity and not
170. See, e.g., Blier v. Greene, 587 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing five-year
statute of limitations that applied to sexual assault case); Billups v. Carter, 604 S.E.2d 414,
419 (Va. 2004) (noting one-year limitations period for assault and battery); Jennifer Wrig-
gins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 139-40 (2001) (noting short statute of
limitations for intentional torts and the difficulties this raises for victims of domestic vio-
lence). But see McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1171-72 (Wyo. 2001) (holding that based
on express statute of limitations exception for "sexual assault," action for sexual assault
needed to be filed in four years, rather than under one-year limit for assault and battery).
171. See, e.g., L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 920 (Alaska 2001) (holding that child sexual
assault victim could recover on claims that were brought within the statute of limitations
when she "remembers but does not appreciate until later the causal connection between
the [abuse] and its psychological or emotional effect" and that credibility of testimony is
for the jury to hear and decide); Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 217 (Ill. 2000) (statute of
limitations barring claim of childhood sexual assault against clergyman and religious or-
der); Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287, 294 (Ill. 2000) (holding that statute of limitations
began to run when parishioner, who was sexually assaulted as a minor, reached the age of
majority even though she alleged that she did not make the connection between the sexual
relationship and her injuries until later); Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 299 (R.I. 2001)
(holding that statute of limitations had run despite adult parishioner's claim that she did
not appreciate the full nature and extent of her injuries).
172. See, e.g., Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000) (permitting plaintiff to
sue step-father).
173. Miller v. Monongali County Bd. of Educ., 556 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 2001).
174. See Palacios v. Robbins, No. 04-02-00838-CV, 2003 WL 21502371, at *2 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Jul 2,2003, pet. denied) (holding that husband, who failed to request a
jury finding on his statute of limitations defense, had waived the issue on appeal).
175. 551 S.E.2d 644 (Va. 2001).
176. Id. at 331.
177. Id. at 332.
178. Id. at 331.
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intended to obstruct her filing of an action."'1 79 Given this extremely nar-
row reading of the statute's tolling provision, the plaintiff was not permit-
ted to pursue her civil claim for assault and battery against the assailant
even after he was identified.' 80
Other defenses can be fraught with peril for victims as well. Although
traditionally intentional tortfeasors such as rapists were not allowed to
defend based on the victim's contributory fault, a few courts have permit-
ted victim comparative-fault defenses to even the most egregious inten-
tional torts. This practice has become a more open question with a
number of state courts' and legislatures' adoption of comparative appor-
tionment rather than comparative negligence statutes.18 1  Permitting
comparative fault to serve as a defense to an intentional tort raises the
alarming prospect that an intentional tortfeasor, like a rapist, can dimin-
ish his legal responsibility to the victim by blaming her for the rape. For
example, in one Louisiana case, a thirteen-year-old girl was found twelve
percent liable for her own gang rape, because she went with the group of
boys to drink some beer. 182 Although Louisiana enacted a statute that
would now prevent this result, 183 that statute is imperfect,1 84 and few
states have yet enacted similar limitations. 185
While states generally continue to preclude an intentional tortfeasor
defendant, like a rapist, from reducing his responsibility for damages
based on a victim's negligence, 186 legal authorities have failed to ensure
that a holding like Louisiana's will not be replicated.1 87 For example, the
Restatement Third of Torts: Apportionment of Liability took "no posi-
tion on whether a plaintiff's negligence is a comparative defense to inten-
tional torts."'1 8 8 While the Restatement provides courts with "flexibility
to fashion appropriate special rules for victims of intentional torts,"189 it
179. Id. at 332.
180. Id.
181. See generally Bublick, The End Game, supra note 162 (researching recent cases
and finding trend toward comparing intentional and negligent torts of defendants, not of
plaintiff and defendant, but noting the possibility for spillover particularly from courts that
speak in broad terms and are not aware of different contexts).
182. Morris v. Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Camp Resort, 539 So. 2d 70, 72 (La. Ct. App.
1989).
183. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2323(c) (West 2005) ("If a person suffers injury, death, or
loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an inten-
tional tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced").
184. Even in Louisiana, the percentage shares are still assigned between assailants, vic-
tims, and others, Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding
jury assignment of fault to estranged wife whose husband came to her workplace on a
crime spree, held her hostage, and sexually assaulted her), although the assailant may not
be permitted to take advantage of a reduction in damages from them.
185. Bublick, The End Game, supra note 162.
186. Id. at 390-91 (discussing court's broad language about "comparing intentional and
negligent fault" but finding that court comparisons rarely arise between intentional
tortfeasor defendants and negligent plaintiffs absent special cases such as high-culpability
plaintiffs, or low-culpability defendants).
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cmt. c.
188. Id. (specifically citing Morris).
189. Id. § 3 cmt. d (proposing plaintiff no-duty rules).
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does not provide an imperative for them to do so. I have elsewhere ar-
gued that courts and legislatures should follow the lead of certain jurisdic-
tions to make victim comparative-fault defenses off-limits in rape and
other intentional tort cases. 190 The Washington Supreme Court's limita-
tion on the victim's duty is an exemplar in this area. 191
Given the varied substantive concerns in tort actions against alleged
assailants themselves, the tort law is appropriately viewed as a forum with
a variety of distinct advantages for victims, but also one in which difficul-
ties remain. Given this unidealized reality, civil litigation still may serve a
valuable function-in particular, allowing the victim to direct this evenly
matched and flexible inquiry to seek remedies in her own interests
through the settlement process or trial itself. However, it would be
wrong to suggest that this shift might not entail social costs or that tort
fora will be a panacea for victims' concerns.
III. CIVIL-LAW RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAPE:
BEYOND ASSAILANTS
If third-party actions were not viable in tort, lawyers would not have
pursued so many cases. The large number of appellate court opinions
concerning third-party liability to sexual assault victims testifies to both
the viability of these claims, and the flux and uncertainty that pervades
this area of law. These uncertainties span a broad number of legal ques-
tions. I have clustered the most pervasive and important issues that arise
in the case law into four categories-which actors are responsible for tak-
ing care to prevent sexual assault, the appropriate measure of damages
for victims of sexual assault and the way in which those damages are ap-
portioned among multiple actors, the availability of compensation such as
insurance to cover victim losses, and the protection of victim privacy
within and through the tort process. Each of these four issues will be
examined in turn.
A. RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAPE PREVENTION
Which actors are responsible for using care to prevent rape? The issue
of appropriate responsibility is an open one. Perhaps the most litigated
issue in the appellate cases is whether and to what extent third parties
must take reasonable care to prevent sexual assault. Courts' answers
vary widely, revealing perhaps why appellate litigation is so prevalent,
and why further discussion of these issues is essential.
190. See Ellen Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1999) [hereinafter Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules]; see also LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323(c) (West 2005) (barring comparative fault claims filed by assail-
ants); Hutchinson v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 847-49 (Pa. 2001) (barring comparative fault
claims pursued by third parties).
191. See Christensen v. Royal Sch. Dist. No.160, 2005 WL 3346205, at *5-6 (Wash. 2005)
("we hold as a matter of public policy that children do not have a duty to protect them-
selves from sexual abuse").
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In doctrinal terms, issues of third-party responsibility for sexual assault
generally arise in two areas of the negligence case-duty and proximate
cause.1 92 A tort duty can be created in a number of circumstances involv-
ing special relationships.' 93 When created, the duty involves use of rea-
sonable care to protect against foreseeable harms but not others. 19 4 As
such, a frequent issue in the tort law is when rape is foreseeable. The case
law vacillates between broad rulings about rape as a foreseeable fact of
modern life195 and rape as an unlikely event that cannot be foreseen un-
less committed by the same person in exactly the same situation just
before. 196
Situational factors play an important role in these foreseeability deter-
minations. For example, two frequent lines of litigation involve employ-
ers' responsibility for sexual assaults committed by their employees and
property owners' liability for sexual assaults that take place on their prop-
erty. Courts have taken a far broader view of the foreseeability of sexual
assault in the premises cases than in the employment cases. This division
is perhaps ironic in that employers are thought to control their employees
and, in some contexts, are even vicariously liable for their employees'
conduct, 197 unlike the more distant relationship of landowner and tres-
passer or even landowner and invitee. 198
In the premises liability context, courts have found sexual assaults fore-
seeable even in the absence of directly-similar prior assaults. Courts have
held that violent crimes of a different variety and in a different location
can make rape foreseeable on a given property.1 99 In addition, evidence
of prior sexual assaults by strangers can suggest the foreseeability of sub-
192. Third-party liability issues are typically presented in terms of negligence, although
claims of recklessness have been pursued. In a negligence action, a victim's claim must
allege that the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care for the victim, failed to do so,
and that but for that failure of care the victim would not have been assaulted and suffered
consequent harm. The victim must also allege that the resultant harm was the type risked
by the defendant's failure of care.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314(a), 315(a), 321, 323 (1965).
194. The level of generality at which the duty question is asked can also be significant to
the outcome of a case. See Pathways, Inc. v. Hammond, 113 S.W.3d 85, 94 (Ky. 2003)
(Stumbo, J., dissenting) (objecting to court's detailed specification of the duty issue and
instead wanting the court to ask whether the agency owed its clients duty of reasonable
care, rather than duty to undertake a particular act).
195. See Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 773 A.2d 1045, 1048-50 (Me 2001).
196. See Reed v. Kelly, 37 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
197. See Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278 (N.Y. 1979) (holding employer liable to
customer injured when cook-employee flipped a knife).
198. See Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 n.3 (Ga. 2004) (holding
that "the policy reasons for that higher standard in premises liability cases have no applica-
tion to negligent hiring/retention cases" for the ironic reason that premises owners have no
control over "illegal behavior of unknown assailants who come onto its property" while
employers have "exclusive control" over hiring and opportunities to harm potential
plaintiffs).
199. See Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, 558 S.E.2d 663, 673 (W. Va. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that "similar incidents" to rape included a variety of criminal acts that occurred in parts of
four states).
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sequent acquaintance rapes. 2°° In fact, in the premises context, an ac-
quaintance rape may be foreseeable absent evidence of any prior assaults.
For example, in Stanton v. University of Maine System,20 1 a case involving
acquaintance rape in a college dorm room, the court held that rape is
foreseeable on college campuses, notwithstanding the university's asser-
tion that it had received no report of a rape or sexual assault in the pre-
ceding five years. As such, a jury was permitted to examine whether the
university had breached its duty of care. 20 2
In contrast to this broad view of foreseeable sexual assault in premises
liability cases,203 court decisions in the employment context have been far
more circumspect.204 In the employment cases, courts typically do not
ask whether employers knew of prior crimes or rapes by employees in
general or in the types of work situations in which their employees are
involved, for example door-to-door sales. 205 Instead, to show that sexual
assault was foreseeable in the employment context, plaintiffs often have
to show that the employer was aware of prior misconduct by the particu-
lar employee accused of abuse.20 6 Exactly what kind of prior misconduct
is enough to make a subsequent sexual assault foreseeable is a question
raised in a number of cases. If the employer knew or should have known
that the employee committed a previous rape, a subsequent rape will typ-
ically be considered foreseeable-triggering a duty.207 But at times, even
the employer's knowledge of prior assaults or sexual assaults by the par-
ticular employee did not make the subsequent sexual assault foreseeable
200. In L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center, 75 S.W.3d 247 (Mo 2002), a twelve-
year-old girl was raped in a shopping mall catwalk by a boy she had met the previous week.
Although a friend tried to summon two security guards to the scene, they dismissed her
and made no investigation. Id. at 250-51. When the court examined, as a part of its duty
analysis, whether the rape was foreseeable, it declined to adopt a formal "similar inci-
dents" or "totality of the circumstances" test. Id. at 256. Still, when addressing how similar
"similar incidents" of crime had to be to make future rapes foreseeable, the court decided
that a plaintiff need not prove "identical crimes in identical locations." Id. at 259. Prior
violent crimes by strangers made other violent crimes, even by acquaintances, foreseeable
as well. Id.
201. 773 A.2d 1045 (Me 2001).
202. Id.
203. But see Goins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 800 So. 2d 783 (La. 2001) (rejecting prem-
ises liability claim when security guards hired by store stopped men who later raped plain-
tiff, but did not continue to observe them).
204. See, e.g., Monroe v. Universal Health Servs., 596 S.E.2d 604, 608 (Ga. 2004) (hold-
ing no negligent hiring or retention of nursing home employee who sexually assaulted
plaintiff).
205. Rogers v. Burger King Corp., 82 P.3d 116, 122 (Ok. 2003) (not accounting for
remote location and late hours). But see Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, 63 P.3d 1009, 1015
(Alaska 2003) (noting, among other factors, that program for disabled women "knew that
staff abuse of dcvclopmcntally disabled residential clients was a risk").
206. A requirement of prior misconduct by a particular employee suggests that rape is
committed by certain bad actors rather than opportunistic ones, which may not be an accu-
rate picture of the assailants. See generally Katharine Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational
Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997).
207. See Kodiak Island Borough, 63 P.3d at 1011 (finding borough that operated facility
for developmentally disabled women was negligent in hiring and giving room keys to an
employee who had been convicted twenty-eight times of criminal offenses, including felony
assault).
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to the employer.208 In the murkier circumstance in which there were
prior problems with, but not necessarily sexual assaults by, the employee,
cases also go both ways. In some cases, employer notice of prior
problems with the employee make subsequent employer action (or more
typically inaction) negligent. 20 9 Yet in other cases, the employee's prior
misconduct was not sufficient to raise a triable claim. 210 Similarly, em-
ployee misconduct with one group of persons did not necessarily make
foreseeable inappropriate sexual conduct toward others. 211
Despite this narrow doctrine requiring prior bad acts in employer lia-
bility cases, courts allowed some claims of employer negligence when the
assaulting employee had no apparent record of prior misconduct. For ex-
ample, in N.X. v. Cabrini Medical Center, a surgical resident committed
208. See Reed v. Kelly, 37 S.W. 3d 274, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) ("In this case there is
no nexus as a matter of law between Kelly's slapping his wife and his fistfights with a co-
employee, both of which were angry physical altercations with persons he knew, and his
commission of sexual assault on a stranger."); see also Hunter v. Dep't of Corr., 57 P.3d
755, 759 (Idaho 2002) (holding that car wash could not foresee that employee who was on
probation for "a sexual offense" and prohibited to interact with minors would rape and
murder teenager who worked at the car wash); Bean v. Directions Unlimited, Inc., 609
N.W.2d 567, 570 n.5 (Mich. 2000) (holding that non-profit, which hired recovery center
employee with past conviction of criminal sexual conduct involving a woman of limited
mental abilities and gave him key to the center, was not liable for respondeat superior,
negligent hiring or negligent supervision when employee engaged in sexual activity with
woman of limited mental ability at the center because jury appropriately held that the
employer's negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury).
209. In Saine v. Comcast Cablevision of Arkansa, Inc.s, 126 S.W.3d 339 (Ark. 2003), in a
particularly grisly set of facts, a Comcast employee raped and attempted to murder a Coin-
cast customer in her home. Id. at 340. The victim, who survived the atrocities, sued Con-
cast for vicarious liability and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. Id. The plaintiff
abandoned the vicarious liability claim, and the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that she
had failed to show a genuine issue of material fact on her remaining negligent hiring claim.
Id. at 341-42. With respect to negligent supervision and retention, however, the court re-
versed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Comcast. Id. In response
to its inquiry about whether Comcast knew or should have known that its employee posed
a risk, the court found that a serious prior complaint against the employee had been re-
ported. Id. at 43-44. Comcast had not followed up, however, or even kept a record of the
complaint. Id. Comcast had no system for recording complaints. Id. In light of the prior
complaint to nowhere, the plaintiff's claim on the negligent supervision and retention
claims was allowed to proceed. Id.; see also Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d
545, 596 (Haw. 2003) (holding that prior indictment of school teacher for sexual miscon-
duct should have prompted further school inquiry even though employee was found not
guilty).
210. See Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., 596 S.E.2d 604 (Ga. 2004) (upholding sum-
mary judgment for employer who hired employee for mental health position involving per-
sonal contact with medicated, vulnerable patients despite third-party background check
which suggested that employee had misrepresented reasons for firing, and could not ac-
count for much of his prior educational or employment experience).
211. See Keller v. Koca, 111 P.3d 445, 450-51 (Colo. 2005) (holding that employer's
knowledge of employee's sexual misconduct toward female workers and customers did not
make assault on child who accompanied another employee to work foreseeable); see also
S. Baldwin Reg'l Medical Ctr. v. E.P., 785 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. 2000) (holding that while it
was "debatable" whether hospital administrators exercised "sound judgment" in allowing a
nurse with a history of emotional outbursts towards fellow employees and an elderly pa-
tient to work in direct contact with patients, the "particular criminal conduct" had to be
foreseeable, and the nurse's molestation of a six-year-old child in the presence of her fam-
ily was not foreseeable).
SMU LAW REVIEW
sexual assault on a patient recovering from surgery.212 The New York
Supreme Court allowed the victim to maintain an action for negligent
supervision against the medical center despite a record of no prior mis-
conduct by the resident, because sexual abuse of a patient in a post-surgi-
cal care situation may have been either observed or observable. 213 Yet
when sexual abuse was actually observed by an employee but committed
by an independent-contractor security guard who the employee did not
control and could not get immediate help to confront, a claim could not
be stated against the employer. 21 4 Given courts' unwillingness to expand
negligence liability very far in the employment cases, it is surprising that
claims of employer vicarious liability are excluded, 215 and included, 216 in
a similar number of cases.
One question that must be addressed about foreseeability across these
contexts is why a defendant, a hospital for example, should so broadly
212. 765 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 2002).
213. Id. at 848-49. Although the court noted that there is usually no liability for an
employer if the employee had no prior record of misconduct (as was the case here), in this
case the first occasion of abuse may have been either observed or observable, raising an
issue about whether other employees knew or should have known about the assault as it
was occurring. Id. at 848. Hospital nurses were in close physical proximity to the resident
and patient, and knew of a hospital policy not permitting gynecological examinations with-
out a female nurse present. Id. at 848-49.
214. See Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 760 (D.C. 2001) (not permitting
negligent supervision claim against store despite allegation that store employee was pre-
sent at the time an independent security guard hired by the store sexually assaulted an
alleged shoplifter because the employee did not have power to control the security guard
or an opportunity to contact someone else).
215. See Kennedy v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 857 So. 2d 71 (Ala. 2003) (holding in a fractured
opinion that franchisor was not liable for manager's sexual assaults on employees, except
possibly on direct negligence claim); Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone County Skilled Nurs-
ing Facility, 49 S.W.3d 107, 116 (Ark. 2001) (holding that assault by nursing aid on
quadriplegic patient was a criminal act undertaken for the employee's own purposes);
Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 580 S.E.2d 215, 219 (Ga. 2003); Ocana v. Am. Furniture,
91 P.3d 58 (N.M. 2004) (finding no vicarious liability, negligent supervision or retention
because employer had no prior notice of employee misbehavior); N.X., 765 N.E.2d at 847
(holding that sexual assault was committed with "wholly personal motives" and that this
defeated finding of vicarious liability under New York case law).
216. See Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 758 (D.C. 2001) (rejecting "as
too broad the statement in the trial court's order that 'sexual assaults are as a matter of
law, solely for the employee's benefit"' and holding that respondeat superior claim should
have gone to the jury to see if security guard's sexual assault of suspected shoplifter was
"motivated to any extent by his desire to serve his employer"); Doe v. The Salvation Army,
835 So. 2d 76, 79 (Miss 2003) (finding camp liable for counselor's sexual assault on the
basis that "a master who places a servant in a position of trust or authority is responsible
for the actions of his servant"); Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 539 S.E.2d 426,
428-429 (Va. 2000) (holding that in light of evidence that the circumstances of gas station
attendant's employment facilitated sexual assault on customer, court erred in granting
summary judgment on respondeat superior claim); Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48, 67 (Vt.
2004) (rejecting several theories of vicarious liability but holding that "if the plaintiff can
show that an on-duty law enforcement officer was aided in an intentional tort involving a
sexual assault on the plaintiff by the existence of the employment relationship with the law
enforcement agency, vicarious liability will apply"); see also Christopher E. Krueger, Mary
M. v. City of Los Angeles: Should a City be Held Liable Under Respondeat Superior for a
Rape By a Police Officer, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 460-61 (1994) (concluding that a city
should be held liable under respondeat superior).
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foresee rapes on its property but not by its employees. 217 Foreseeability
tests might be made more consistent across categories or form a more
minor part of the duty question. Tort law generally is evolving toward a
general duty of reasonable care to prevent physical harms.218 The expan-
sion of incidents considered similar under prior-similar-incidents tests in
the recent premises liability cases and the loosening of employee prior-
bad-act standards in some employment cases may ultimately suggest a
flaw in the prior-acts-based tests of foreseeability itself. Perhaps colleges
should use reasonable care for students not just in reaction to reports of
recent bad acts, but based on principles of special relationship and struc-
tural safety. In the shorter term, whether courts should adopt a broad
view of similar incidents and ultimately foreseeability or a narrow one
depends upon the fundamental policy question of the extent to which
policymakers and the public want private parties to exercise reasonable
precautions to protect against sexual assault like other physical safety
risks.219
Outside the premises liability and employment contexts, the question
of responsibility for rape prevention is no more certain. When consider-
ing whether to impose a duty of reasonable care that encompasses care to
prevent sexual assault, courts have been willing to impose reasonable
care requirements on a number of private actors but have been less sym-
pathetic to imposing such obligations on public entities. Private actors,
parents, foster parents, and others in parental-type situations have been
held to have obligations of care to children. In Mary Anne "ZZ" v.
Blasen, for example, a parent who had promised to supervise her daugh-
ter's friend was found to have a duty to supervise that encompassed tak-
ing reasonable care to prevent rape. 220 Similarly, in some states, foster
parents can be sued for negligent supervision that allegedly led to a sex-
ual assault between foster children, 221 and placement agencies can be
217. See Diaz v. N.Y. Downtown Hosp., 784 N.E.2d 68, 69 (N.Y. 2002) (upholding hos-
pital's motion for summary judgment on negligent supervision claim on the basis that
plaintiff expert did not create a triable issue on industry standard when expert stated that
recommended policy of two national organizations was to have woman in the room when
male technician performed transvaginal sonogram "to ensure the personal safety of the
female patient").
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRIN-
CIPLES) § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1 2001).
219. See generally Leslie Bender & Perette Lawrence, Is the Tort Law Male?: Foresee-
ability Analysis and Property Managers' Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993).
220. 284 A.D.2d 773,774-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that jury could decide rea-
sonableness of mother's inattention to babysitting girls, when mother told friend's mother
that she would keep an eye on the girls).
221. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 70 P.3d 904 (Utah 2003). In
Smith, the Department of Human Services (DHS) and Four Corners Mental Health Center
(Four Corners) placed two foster children with the Randalls. Id. at 907. One of the chil-
dren, J.B., was alleged to have a violent character and homosexual tendencies. Id. at 908.
When that child attacked the other, DHS and Four Corners were not liable. Id. at 914.
However, the foster parents were not protected from suit by either governmental or paren-
tal immunity. Id. at 912, 916. Governmental immunity was denied because the foster par-
ents were not employees of DHS but rather independent contractors. Id. at 912.
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sued for negligent placement of a child in foster care. 222 An adult, who
was not a parent but a boyfriend acting in loco parentis, had an obligation
to control the child who committed the assault and protect the child who
was assaulted under his watch.22 3 Temporary guardians of children may
also be sued.224 Other kinds of custodial care givers, such as nursing
homes2 25 and psychiatric facilities,226 have been held to have such a duty
that encompasses reasonable care to prevent sexual assault as well. In
cases involving a more fleeting relationship without overtones of depen-
dency, such as that between the church and a person who attends a
church service, however, the relationship has not been held to create a
duty to warn of prior sexual assaults, for instance by a priest.
227
In terms of public actors, whether state actors are immune from suit
often turns on whether the public entity had purchased liability insurance
coverage, 228 was grossly negligent, 229 or had a special duty to protect the
Moreover, parental immunity did not apply as it is not recognized in Utah and had been
inadequately briefed. Id. at 916. Although the foster parents also argued that they had no
duty because the assault was not foreseeable, there was evidence that some violence was
foreseeable as J.B. had beaten his own mother and threatened his siblings. Id. at 917.
222. See, e.g., Savage v. Utah, 104 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2004).
223. Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906, 924 (Wis. 2000) (but rejecting the claim
that there was a duty to warn of ten-year-old's prior behavior).
224. See, e.g., Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002) (church may be sued despite
First Amendment); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (suit by parishioners against
archdiocese for claims relate to sexual assaults by priest).
225. See, e.g., Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, 49
S.W.3d 107, 112 (Ark. 2001) (citing a Washington state case for the proposition that
"[w]hile an employer generally does not have a duty to guard against the possibility that
one of its employees may be an undiscovered sexual predator, a group home for develop-
mentally disabled persons has a duty to protect residents from such predators regardless of
whether those predators are strangers, visitors, other residents, or employees").
226. See, e.g., Bryson v. Banner Health Sys., 89 P.3d 800 (Alaska 2004) (holding that
substance abuse treatment facility which knew of probationer's extensive criminal history
of crimes of violence including sexual assault, placed probationer in support group in which
members were encouraged to rely on each other, and failed to warn members that proba-
tioner might be dangerous had a duty to take reasonable care to protect patient from dan-
ger in the course of her treatment); Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 523 S.E.2d
826 (Va. 2000) (holding that psychiatric facility that was aware of victim's history of sexual
abuse and assailant's "troubled history" and HIV status but took no action when he was in
her room on an unauthorized basis, could be sued for negligence).
227. See Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 802 A.2d 391, 393 (Me.
2002); see also Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 755 So. 2d 395, 400 (Miss. 2000) (no duty of
youth sports organization that funded program for disadvantaged children to supervise
children).
228. See, e.g., Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 755 So. 2d 395, 400 (Miss. 2000) ("a gov-
ernmental entity which has in effect a policy of liability insurance which covers the tort
sued upon will waive immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage").
229. See Doe v. Baum, 72 S.W.3d 476, 486-82 (Ark. 2002) (holding that summary judg-
ment was properly granted against girl who had been sexually assaulted by fellow student
while on school bus, because state department of education had no responsibility to pro-
vide liability insurance and plaintiff had not established gross negligence by showing that
bus driver was aware of earlier incident of sexual assault by student on the bus); Hunter v.
Dep't of Corr., 57 P.3d 755, 759 (Idaho 2002) (estate of decedent who was raped and
murdered by probationer could prove liability "by showing that the State acted with malice
or criminal intent or that the State's action was reckless, willful and wanton" and that
discretionary function immunity did not protect the state against liability for a reckless
[Vol. 59
2006] Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies 91
plaintiff23 0-a much more limited responsibility. Yet in some cases, a
public entity was held to be grossly negligent, as when a teenager per-
forming community service work for the city was left alone with an incar-
cerated prisoner who raped her.231 In other cases, the gross negligence
issue was at least one for the jury, as when a school district did not pro-
vide a substitute school-bus attendant on a bus that included the men-
tally-impaired special-education-student plaintiff and the defendant, who
had been declared a sexually aggressive child and had a protective plan
which required that he not be left unsupervised with other children. 232
In the absence of available insurance, gross negligence, or a special re-
lationship with the plaintiff, courts have often held that the defendant is
immune from suit233 or, alternatively, had no duty or breached no duty to
the plaintiff.234 At times though, government actors may even be sued
for negligence. 235 And when a state permits liability of public employees,
even if for gross negligence rather than negligence alone, using doctrines
such as the public duty doctrine 236 "to shield all government employees
from tort liability is at least arguably inconsistent with this statutory
scheme. '237 Moreover, particular state statutes may, by their terms, pre-
operational decision, but that rape-murder was not foreseeable harm by the probationed
rapist).
230. See, e.g., Doe v. State ex. rel. Miss. Dep't. of Corr., 859 So. 2d 35-, 359-60 (Miss.
2003) (state department of corrections enjoying immunity from suit brought by victim of
rape committed by parolee); Wood v. Guilford County, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (N.C. 2002)
(public duty doctrine preventing assault victim from suing county absent claim of special
relationship, but not preventing her action against private security contractor). But see
Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Educ., 808 N.E.2d 861, 867-68 (Ohio 2004) (holding public-duty
rule inapplicable on the basis that child sexual assault reporting statute was meant not only
for the benefit of the specific child abused but for the protection of children in danger of
abuse from the same source, in this case a school teacher).
231. See, e.g., Ashmore v. Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (funding
city was grossly negligent for failing to supervise).
232. See ex rel. Doe v. Chicago Ortega-Piton Bd. of Educ., 820 N.E.2d 418, 420, 424 (I11.
2004).
233. See also Doe v. Jenkins, 547 S.E.2d 124 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that county
had sovereign immunity that precluded suit brought by courthouse visitor for sexual as-
sault by a stranger in the women's bathroom); Carter v. Glenn, 548 S.E.2d 110, 111 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2001) (finding in suit based on rape by on-duty police officer, police chief and
mayor were immune from suit); Ex Parte Blankenship v. Jackson, 806 So. 2d 1186, 1186,
1189 (Ala. 2001) (school principal and band director had discretionary immunity for al-
lowing adult male who was not a student at the school to participate in the band and leave
the school grounds with thirteen-year-old). But see District of Columbia v. Harris, 770
A.2d 82 (D.C. 2001).
234. See, e.g., Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (finding city
police department not liable for negligent referral of problem officer who later went on a
crime spree).
235. Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ. 58 P.3d 545, 579 (Haw. 2003) (holding that
under state tort claims act state could be sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress
as well as negligent retention and supervision of teacher).
236. Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Mich. 2001) ("the public duty doc-
trine provides only that a plaintiff cannot rely on the fact that a public employee owes
general duties to the public at large to support a claim of negligence").
237. Id. at 315-16 (holding that rape victim could sue police dispatcher who, because of
friendship with assailant's mother, did not tell police the whereabouts of the assailant while
the victim was being held captive).
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clude immunity.2 38 Public entities may have limited duties of care to pro-
tect against sexual assault in the constitutional tort context as well. 239
However, this does not mean that they or their agents can initiate sexual
assaults.240
The issues about scope of responsibility to use care for rape prevention
are not confined to the doctrinal issue of duty. Proximate or legal cause
issues are prominent in the recent cases addressing third-party responsi-
bility for rape prevention. The question presented in these proximate-
cause cases is whether a duty to exercise care encompasses an obligation
to take reasonable care to protect against rape and sexual assault. For
example, is a casino's dram shop obligation not to serve a patron intoxi-
cating liquors after she is drunk designed in part to protect her from
rape?241 Are laws requiring mental health advisors to refer patients to
licensed boarding homes designed to prevent patients from unsafe condi-
tions including the possibility of sexual assault?2 42 Is it unreasonable to
238. Hubbard v. Canton City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Ohio 2002) (find-
ing in a case in which students had been sexually assaulted by a teacher, board of education
not immune from liability for damages based on court's reading of state immunity statute).
239. See Ashmore v. Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131, 1140-41 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (although city
had no policy for juveniles doing community service, finding no evidence of a need for a
policy other than this sexual assault, such that plaintiff failed to prove a claim for 1983
liability).
240. See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 918-19 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
officer's threats that woman would be jailed for forty years if she did not cooperate with
sting operation that required her to pose as a prostitute and offer oral sex was rape, which
constituted a serious battery and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, although qual-
ified immunity applied to this new legal interpretation). In Virginia, a court with a number
of extreme holdings, the court took an unusual approach to determining that a city was not
liable for the intentionally wrongful acts of its police. In Niese v. City of Alexandria, 564
S.E.2d 127, 132 (Va. 2002), the court determined that a rape committed by a police officer
during his investigation of the victim's complaint concerning her son was an immune gov-
ernmental rather than proprietary function because the investigation of the victim's com-
plaint "was tied to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens."
241. See Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., 648 N.W.2d 137, 148-50 (Iowa 2002) (raising
potential proximate cause question in dram shop action against casino); cf. Westerback v.
Harold LeClair Co., 735 N.E.2d 1256, 1258-60 (Mass. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that bar that
served victim alcohol past the point of intoxication was not the proximate cause of her
assault and rape while she was staggering home).
242. See Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85 (Ky. 2003). In Pathways, a private
non-profit agency offered services for a mentally ill person. Consulting a very out of date
list of boarding homes, a case worker recommended an unregistered boarding home oper-
ating in violation of court order. Id. at 87. Patient went to the boarding home and was hit
by another boarder. When she went to the hospital for treatment, the hospital tried to get
the patient to stay elsewhere. However, the patient returned to the boarding house and
was sexually assaulted by the other boarder. In a suit by the victim against Pathways and
the boarding house, the court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit. Id. at 88. The
Kentucky Supreme Court found the no duty argument "repugnant" considering the vulner-
ability of counselees, and the fact that the unregistered boarding home created a risk to the
patient's physical safety. Id. at 89. The court also felt that it was a breach of duty for
Pathways not to disseminate to its employees updates sent by the department of public
health. Id. at 90-91. However, the court felt that the key issue was whether it was no longer
Pathways' fault once the victim returned to the boarding house after having been assaulted
once. Rather than count this a comparative fault argument to be weighed by the jury, the
court held that the victim was on notice that the facility was unsafe and chose to return,
such that the defendant was not the proximate cause of the sexual assault. Id. at 95. A
dissenter felt that the duty had been articulated too narrowly and that the defendant was
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hire an incompetent technician to go into people's homes, because the
technician may not only perform the job poorly but may rape one of the
homeowners? 243 Is negligence that leads to a tire's failure in a remote
area the proximate cause of a rape and murder there?2 44 In the vast ma-
jority of cases in which the proximate cause issue is raised by the court,
that doctrine operates to defeat the plaintiff's liability claim against the
defendant. 245
Although issues about the scope of the defendant's responsibility for
care to prevent sexual assault are usually addressed under the doctrine of
duty or proximate cause, actual cause can also be at issue.246 Actual
cause issues are generally fact-based questions about whether a change in
defendant's negligent conduct would have averted the harm. However,
California courts indiscriminately refer to proximate cause (sometime
called legal cause) and actual cause. 247 Under this blended formula, Cali-
fornia is apparently alone in the extent of its use of an aggressive actual
cause doctrine to defeat sexual assault claims.248 Although the court's
the proximate cause given plaintiffs inability to make rational choices for herself. Id. at
94.
243. Saine v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., 126 S.W.3d 339, 334-35 (Ark. 2003) (dis-
missing negligent hiring claim-as the harm that resulted was outside the scope of injury
risked by the negligence-because the only thing that would likely have been discovered
by an adequate background check was that the assailant employee was not a very good
cable installer, not that he had perpetrated prior crimes, ); see, e.g., Regions Bank & Trust
v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, 49 S.W.3d 107, 116 (Ark. 2001) (indicating that
inexperience of nursing aid did not give rise to a reasonable probability that he would
commit assault to establish negligent supervision claim).
244. See Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 258-59 (Neb. 2003).
245. See, e.g., Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
police department reference in favor of officer that did not mention officer's history of
violence was not proximate cause of violence he committed in his later job at Sheriff's
department, in part because department learned about that violence a few months before
employee's crime spree and decided not to fire him). However, the dissent, which focused
on foreseeability of the ultimate harm rather than of the intervening disclosure, explained
"you can easily associate the duty not to recommend [the assailant officer] with his history
of mental illness, being sexually abused, and his abusive treatment toward women, even
while serving as a law enforcement officer, with the horrific acts he committed in this mat-
ter." Id. at 79 (Guidry, J., dissenting). But see Simpson v. Boyd, 880 So. 2d 1047, 1054
(Miss. 2004) (leaving proximate cause issue to jury in case alleging that obstructing emer-
gency exits in violation of fire code was proximate cause of secretary's inability to escape
from armed assailant in workplace).
246. See Lively v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., No. 2-02-418-CV, 2004 WL
1699913, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Jul. 29, 2004, no pet. h.) (barring nurse-victim's claim against
hospital on the ground that "there is no security system that would prevent a woman who
allows gang members to flag down her vehicle and then opens her door to them").
247. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1145, 1153 (Cal. 2001) (mixing
actual cause, which is typically judged by a but-for or substantial-factor test, with proxi-
mate cause which is judged by a scope-of-risk test asking if the harm that occurred was the
kind of harm to the category of persons that made the negligent act wrongful). California
may not be alone in having difficulty applying actual and proximate cause tests. See State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Kastner, 77 P.3d 1256, 1266 (Col. 2003) (suggesting that a rape
in a vehicle was not covered by car insurance because the car itself did not cause the
assault).
248. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147 (granting summary judgment to owner of apartment
complex that had received in one year 41 reports of trespass, 45 reports of broken perime-
ter fences and gates, criminal activities including gunshots, robberies, sexual assault and
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doctrine formally imposes restrictions based on specific proof of actual
causation, it is clear that policy factors more typically addressed under the
rubric of duty, negligence, or proximate cause underlie this mixed
doctrine. 249
Even when duties are recognized at common law, recently enacted tort
reform statutes sometimes curtail third-party responsibilities. 250 In a
number of jurisdictions, victims filing third-party claims against health
care providers must comply with the requirements of medical malpractice
acts, at least against third-parties 251 and sometimes assailants as well.2 52
Outside the medical malpractice context, plaintiffs may need to comply
with other types of tort reform statutes as well.2 53
It is also unclear to whom defendants' responsibilities are owed. Cur-
rent inquiries about the foreseeability of rape are an intensely gendered
group. Court language about foreseeability is often focused on women or
girls as particularly foreseeable prey. For instance, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court found it foreseeable that a cable company technician might
harm a "female" customer. 254 Similarly, the Maine Supreme Court wrote
rape, and evidence of a gang "headquartered" on the property, because the victim could
not "prove" that defendants' failure to fix gates and hire daytime security guards was a
"substantial factor in causing her injuries"). A dissent in Saelzler notes that California's
present requirement essentially "imposes on plaintiff the burden of showing causation with
certainty." Id. at 632 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 627-629 (addressing burdensome financial costs of providing security,
and expense of protecting a large open area which could only be protected by building "a
Berlin wall."); id. at 641 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (dissent addressing "the economic cost to
tenants of allowing crime to flourish").
250. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women,
Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004).
251. For example, in Utah's Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc. case, the
plaintiff who had been sexually assaulted by a co-foster child could not bring suit against
Four Corners or his caseworker for negligent placement or supervision because he failed to
comply with the Utah Health Care Medical Practice Act. 70 P.3d 904 (Utah 2003). The
court held that the Act applied, because the defendant was a mental health care provider
and the injury related to provision of mental health care services. Id. at 913. Under the
Act, the plaintiff was required to file his case within two years. Id. at 915-16. However,
since the plaintiff was a minor at that time, his statute of limitations did not begin to run
until age of majority. Id. Consequently, his action was timely filed. Id. However, at the
time of filing, the plaintiff did not then request a pre-litigation panel under the Act. Id. at
915. As such, he could not maintain his action so no action against the defendant health
care provider. Id. at 917-18.
252. See Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 833 (Ala. 2000) (stating that "in cases where the
alleged sexual misconduct occurs as part of a physician's examination and/or treatment of a
patient, the conduct is considered to have occurred during the delivery of professional
services, and is therefore cognizable as a medical-malpractice claim" for the purposes of
tort reform). Many state courts that examine this question in the context of liability insur-
ance coverage and vicarious liability have reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at 832-33.
253. See Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, 63 P.3d 1009, 1011 (Alaska 2003) (applying
non-economic damage caps liberally so that four assaults on victim were four separate
claims under the damage cap rules, but holding that jurors should not have been instructed
about existence of damage caps); Velez v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1246 (N.J.
2004) (holding that amendment to the state's Tort Claims Act extending the Act's notice of
claim requirement to actions against public employees applied to claims for intentional
torts, but applying that holding prospectively and not against the plaintiff).
254. Saine v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., No. 02-1388, 2003 WL 22410813, at *4 (Ark.
Oct. 23, 2003).
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that "the concentration of young people, especially young women, on a
college campus, creates a favorable opportunity for criminal behavior. '255
And the Louisiana Supreme Court noted evidence that a "disproportion-
ate number of victims of crimes at the mall were women. '256 This lan-
guage raises questions about whether boys or men harmed in the same
situations would be considered foreseeable victims entitled to precaution,
or whether courts are granting special tort protection to females that they
would not afford to male victims. 257
Overall, the responsibility of parties to anticipate sexual assault has
broadened in a number of contexts in a fairly short time frame. The
many doctrinal rules that have grown up around the issue of responsibil-
ity for rape prevention await more consistent and thoughtful develop-
ment including whether the existence of prior assaults is a sensible
touchstone on which to hinge responsibility for the use of reasonable
care.
B. DAMAGES AND THEIR APPORTIONMENT
BETWEEN MULTIPLE ACTORS.
Damages in sexual assault cases have, at least in part, a significant dig-
nitary dimension. Several of the recent cases raise questions about the
appropriate measure of damages in sexual assault cases. As mentioned in
section II of this article, even in some cases against assailants, juries or
courts assigned liability for sexual assault but then awarded no dam-
ages.2 58 Inadequate damage awards may be a particular issue when the
victim and the assailant are acquaintances or partners.259
255. Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 773 A.2d 1045, 1052 (Me. 2001).
256. L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 254 (Mo. 2002).
257. See Regions Bank & Trust v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, 49 S.W.3d 107,
109 (Ark. 2001) (question of fact about whether nursing home was negligent in permitting
unaccompanied access "to helpless female patients by make aides who had little or no
previous health care experience"); Ashmore v. Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131, 1138-39 (La. Ct.
App. 2003) (quoting the trial court for the following proposition: "[i]rrespective of who is
charged with the duty of supervising inmate[s], one can fathom that even the most careless
man would be accustom[ed] to believing that inmates should not be left alone with a young
girl").
258. See Bean v. Directions Unlimited, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 567, 572 n.10 (Mich. 2000)
(noting jury holding that defendant touched the plaintiff without her consent but that
plaintiff did not suffer damage); A.R.B. v. Elkin, 98 S.W.3d. 99, 103-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding by trial judge that father had committed sexual assault against children but award-
ing only nominal damages to the son and no damages to the daughter who, in the court's
judgment, had not been physically harmed. On appeal, the court held that at a minimum,
both plaintiffs should have been awarded nominal damages, but that further damages
should have been considered as well); Kravitz v. Beech Hill Hosp., 808 A.2d 34, 43 (N.H.
2002) (court did not remand to the lower court for a redetermination of damages, but
instead used the insignificant damages award to determine that the plaintiff had not been
raped and to rule against the plaintiff on liability).
259. Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing damages
assessed for victims who were held hostage, three of whom were sexually assaulted, and
assigning perpetrator's estranged wife less than 25% of damages awarded to an unrelated
victim who was apparently subject to similar violations); A.R.B., 98 S.W.3d. at 104-05; Bea-
ver v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 874-75 (Mont. 2003)
(holding that $9,095 award for sexual assault by co-worker was not inadequate).
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The adequacy of damages has been at issue in third party cases too,
even when the victim was not only raped but murdered. In Brandon v.
Richardson, a case stemming from the rape and murder of Brandon
Teena, whose story was made into the Academy Award-winning movie
Boys Don't Cry, the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the
victim's family was extremely meager-$86,223 for both economic and
non-economic losses (and that only after two state supreme court deci-
sions ruling favorably on a number of claims raised by the victim's fam-
ily). 2 60 Although the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that an award of $0
for the loss of the victim's comfort and companionship "bears no reasona-
ble relationship to the evidence and shocks the conscience, '261 the court
then affirmed the $5,000 award subsequently provided by the trial court
on remand.262
The reasoning the court employed to reach the conclusion that Bran-
don and her mother had a weak familial relationship belied a lack of edu-
cation about the realities attendant to sexual assault. The Brandon court
used testimony that Brandon had not revealed childhood sexual abuse by
her uncle to her mother to undermine the mother's testimony that she
had an open and trusting relationship with her daughter.2 63 However, if
the court had been aware that child victims typically do not report sexual
assault to others, 264 perhaps the court's assessment of the strength of the
underlying relationship would itself have been different.265
That several appellate cases present issues about the adequacy of dam-
age awards is surprising given the procedural status of many appellate-
level sexual assault cases. State appellate-level courts often hear cases
that were dismissed below on either a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, many of the cases addressed by appel-
late courts do not involve damage awards at all.
To be sure, not every case affords such limited damages.266 In cases
against third parties, a significant number of cases award compensatory
260. Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 662 (Neb. 2001).
261. Id.
262. Brandon v. County of Richardson, 653 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Neb. 2002).
263. Id. at 836.
264. See Kamala London & Maggie Bruck, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What
Does the Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 PsYCOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L.
194, 195 (2005) (indicating that the majority of children do not reveal abuse during
childhood).
265. This need for educating judges and juries about rape can be seen in a number of
cases. For example, in Jackson v. Heard, 591 S.E.2d 487, 488-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), the
court permitted testimony that the victim was at the co-detendant's house "to provide sex-
ual services for money," because that testimony if believed would "diminish the possibil-
ity" that she was given a "date rape drug" and "feared rape." However, showing that the
victim was a prostitute might equally have been argued to make her more vulnerable to
rape.
266. Univ. of S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 176 (Miss. 2004) (noting jury award of
$800,000 to doctoral student sexually assaulted and harassed by doctoral committee, but
remanding for new trial in part because damages awarded were too speculative).
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damages from $100,000 to $200,000.267 However, at times verdicts for
third-party damage awards have been quite substantial, exceeding $1 mil-
lion.268 In third-party cases, as elsewhere, punitive damages are only
available in the case of wilful and malicious conduct.269
While the determination of an appropriate damage award can be diffi-
cult, apportioning those damages among multiple actors-the third party,
assailant, and sexual assault victim-can be more difficult from a legal
standpoint. A number of states have recently adopted legal changes-by
statute or case law-that abolish joint and several liability and compare
intentional and negligent torts in at least some contexts.270 Although
these jurisdictions are still in the minority,271 in those states, juries assign
shares of responsibility for the sexual assault to the various parties (and
sometimes non-parties) potentially at fault. Each of the parties is as-
signed a percentage share of the total responsibility, with responsibility
shares totaling one hundred percent.272 I have elsewhere criticized some
of the problems and misunderstandings inherent in this type of compara-
tive apportionment system, 273 and recommended appropriate ameliora-
tive doctrines.274 For the purposes of this paper, two problems seem
267. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc., 642 N.W.2d 648, 651
(Iowa 2002) ($122,500 compensatory damages, $40,000 punitive damages); Koenigstein v.
McKee, No. 2002-CA-092212-MR, 2004 WL 41738, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2004) (up-
holding jury verdict of $200,606 for victim who was sexually assaulted by her uncle) (or-
dered not published, original on file with the author); Ashmore v. Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131,
1134 (La. Ct. App. 2003) ($153,365.64 for victim who was sexually assaulted by inmate
while performing community service for the city); Bradley T. v. Cent. Catholic High Sch.,
653 N.W.2d 813 (Neb. 2002) (damage amount of $125,000 not excessive for student sexu-
ally assaulted at parochial school); Frazier v. Badger, 603 S.E.2d 587, 593 (S.C. 2004)
($200,000 compensatory damages, $200,000 punitive damages).
268. Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, 63 P.3d 1009, 1011 (Alaska 2003) (upholding a
$1.35 million jury verdict in favor of a developmentally disabled woman who became preg-
nant as a result of assault by an employee with twenty-eight prior criminal convictions who
had been given a key to patient's room, based on ruling that four incidents of assault gave
rise to four separate claims and damages were permissible for extraordinary costs of raising
the child conceived during the assaults). Large damage verdicts appear more regularly in
cases filed against the rapist directly.
269. Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So. 2d 76, 82 (Miss. 2003) (deciding that punitive dam-
ages issue would not be submitted to jury when no reasonable trier of fact could find
malice or gross neglect/ reckless disregard).
270. See Bublick, The End Game, supra note 162, at 358.
271. Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory School, Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)
(noting majority and minortiy rules and deciding not to apportion fault between negligent
and intentional tortfeasors).
272. Kodiak Island Burough, 63 P.3d at 1015 (Alaska 2003) (rejecting apportionment
between intentional and negligent tortfeasor defendants); Martin v. Prime Hospitality
Corp., 785 A.2d 16, 21 (N.J. 2001); Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 77 (La. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that it was not error to let the jury decide whether the woman who had
been raped and held hostage by her estranged husband at her place of employment "was
negligent and whether her negligence was a cause of damages" and whether she should be
assigned a percentage of responsibility for the harm that befell her).
273. See supra note 181.
274. For example, the fault of non-parties may not be taken into account, Doe Parents
No. I v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 598 n.50 (Haw. 2003) (refusing to apportion fault
between assailant and third-party on the ground that the assailant was not a party to the
action), and the very duty rule may be adopted. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: APPOR-
TIONMENT OF LIBALITY § 14.
SMU LAW REVIEW
worthy of particular note.275
First, comparative apportionment intensifies concerns about sexual as-
sault victims being considered partially at fault for their own rapes. In
jurisdictions that adopt comparative apportionment, a sexual assault vic-
tim may be assigned a share of the fault for the rape in a case involving
both the rapist and a third party. 276 The fault assignments in these cases
may or may not have a large financial impact on sexual assault victims'
actual recoveries (and could actually increase victims' recoveries if courts
avoid defendant no-duty and no-proximate-cause rulings based on victim
fault and instead allow the issues to go to a jury on comparative fault).2 77
However, I have elsewhere argued that courts should strike these vic-
tim-fault defenses. This is not because victims always behave reasona-
bly.2 7 8 Instead, limits may be justified in light of specific public policy
interests, for example in some situations defendants may be better situ-
ated to attend to plaintiffs' interests than are the plaintiffs themselves. 279
For example in the Pathways case, the plaintiff returned to an unlicensed
mental health facility that had been recommended to her, even though
she had previously suffered harm there. If the plaintiff wasn't competent
to make choices for herself-one of the reasons she was initially referred
to the institution-from a fairness and policy perspective, the law might
not expect her to reasonably process her subsequent choices.280 More
275. Many additional issues arise in comparative apportionment systems. For example,
the percentages of fault assigned to rapists and third-parties is often controversial. See,
e.g., Hunter v. Dep't of Corr., 57 P.3d 755, 762 (Idaho 2002) (arguing that the jury verdict
finding the employer had 20% of the fault for the murder and the murderer 40% "defies
common sense" as the man "who actually killed [plaintiff] had virtually all, if not all the
responsibility for her death").
276. See supra note 272.
277. Questions of plaintiff fault are sometimes implicit in arguments about the defen-
dant's duty or the issue of proximate cause. For example, in Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons,
113 S.W.3d 85, 92-93 (Ky. 2003), the fact that the plaintiff went back to the institution after
she had been assaulted there was not mentioned as plaintiff contributory fault but was
factored into the lack of proximate cause. See also K.R. v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387, 392
(Minn. 2000) (permitting victim to proceed with claim against the bar that employed her
under Liquor Act's civil liability section on the ground that victim's purchase of alcohol for
her attackers was complicity that would be for jury to weigh as comparative fault rather
than absolute bar to recovery).
278. For example, the plaintiff in Horak was kicked out of the bar because on her intox-
ication and obnoxious behavior. Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., 648 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Iowa
2002).
279. See Ellen Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 977 (2003)
(arguing that comparative fault defenses may not be appropriate when, due to systemic
differentials in knowledge, experience, or control, the defendant can be expected to take
better care of the plaintiffs safety than can the plaintiff herself); see also Christensen v.
Royal School Dist. No. 160, 124 P.3d 283, 288 (Wash. 2005).
280. Pathways, Inc., 113 S.W.3d at 94 (Stumbo, J., dissenting) (showing the provider of
psychiatric services who placed client in an unregistered boarding home "knew or should
have known that the severity of the [victim's] mental disorder made it impossible for her to
process choices, consequences, and develop alternative solutions for her housing and finan-
cial needs"). Moreover, going back to a familiar place, even if unsafe, may have been a
rational choice. Id. at 93 (noting plaintiff testimony that she returned to the boarding
house despite having been assaulted because "she had paid rent there through the month
and was without money or means to go elsewhere). Similarly, in Smith, although the as-
saulted foster child may have shared a bedroom for eight months after the assault, the
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broadly, even when not subject to case-specific policy limits, assigning
part of the blame for sexual assault to victims themselves may have signif-
icant negative effects in the aggregate on victim and potential victim, aka
citizen, freedom, equality, and safety.281
Second, and perhaps more practically significant, in jurisdictions that
abolish joint and several liability and adopt comparative apportionment,
sexual assault victims may be left with diminished tort remedies.282
When juries assign percentages of liability to assailants, these percentages
may not be recoverable from the assailants themselves but nevertheless
diminish third parties' liability for damages. Much of this reduction rests
not on judgments of fairness or policy about the wisdom of limiting victim
recoveries, but on a logical fallacy made by courts in those jurisdic-
tions.283 The fallacy is that comparative apportionment assigns responsi-
bility based on the defendant's own fair share of the responsibility. As I
have shown elsewhere, in truth the liability is not based on an assessment
of the defendant's fault, but on an inverse relationship with the fault of
others, which may or may not be justified. 28 4 The concern with diminish-
ing tort recoveries against third-parties is not simply a question of com-
pensation for sexual assault victims, although that is an important
component. It is also a concern about deterring defendants from creat-
ing, ignoring, or disguising foreseeable safety hazards. 285 Accordingly, a
foster child may not have had any reasonable alternate options. Smith v. Four Corners
Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 908 n.3 (Utah 2003); see also Christensen v. Royal
Sch. Dist. No. 160, No. 75214-1, 2005 WL 3346205 (Wash. Dec. 8, 2005) (holding that chil-
dren do not have a duty to protect themselves from sexual abuse).
281. See Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules, supra note 190, at 1420-24.
282. See Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reassigning re-
sponsibility percentages on appeal so that 85% of fault was assigned to jailed intentional
tortfeasor and 15% fell to sheriff's department); see also Brandon v. County of Richardson,
624 N.W.2d 604, 618 (Neb. 2001) (analyzing case in which estate of victim of rape and
murder awarded $80,000 in noneconomic damages, and 85% of the responsibility for the
plaintiff's award was assigned to the imprisoned murderers). On appeal the Nebraska Su-
preme Court refused to permit the Sheriff's Department to compare its negligence with the
murderer's homicide. Had the court not done so, the victim's estate would have been able
to recover only $18,000 for the Sheriff's Department's adjudicated and legally recognized
negligence which led to the death). Id. at 620. Because of intentional-negligent fault com-
parisons in a several liability system, a woman who had been sexually assaulted by a doctor
she was required to see despite her insurance company's knowledge of previous accusa-
tions of sexual assault against the doctor, the assault victim received 60% less of her com-
pensatory damage award-reducing her compensatory damages award against the insurer
from $46,000 to $16,000. See Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 5 P.3d 280, 287-88 (Col.
2000); see also Wallmuth v. Rapides Parish School Board, 813 So. 2d 341, 345, 349 (La.
2002) (evaluating trial court's assignment of 100% of fault to school board and 0% to
intentional tortfeasor, appellate court finding that school board was 70% at fault and inten-
tional tortfeasor 30% at fault, and reversing the judgment against the school board
entirely).
283. See generally Bublick, The End Game, supra note 162.
284. Id. at 407-08 (providing an example of a gunshot wound made by injuring parties
with different degrees of fault treated in the same way by a negligent doctor).
285. For example, after a door-to-door vacuum cleaner sales company was held liable
for damages in a case in which an employee with a prior history of sexual assault convic-
tions raped a customer in her home, the company instituted the employee background
checks that it had previously maintained it was unable to institute. Read v. Scott Fetzer
Co., 990 S.W.2d 732, 736 n.1 (Tex. 1998). Similarly, liability may persuade companies to
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number of victims' groups have opposed comparative apportionment
rules that include intentional torts.286
C. AVAILABILITY OF COMPENSATION
If a judgment is awarded, the availability of insurance, indemnification,
and workers compensation to meet the monetary claims of sexual assault
victims becomes important. A number of current cases address insurance
coverage for sexual assault claims. The policies from which coverage has
been sought include homeowner's policies, 287 commercial general liability
policies,288 professional liability policies, 2 9 self-insurance funds,29 0 and
others.291 The question in these cases is generally not whether a victim
can seek coverage from an insured who commits an intentional tort such
as battery. That coverage has been consistently barred.292 Instead, the
questions more typically concern whether insurance policies cover claims
of negligence lodged against the assailants themselves293 or against third-
introduce inexpensive security measures that can produce "outstanding" results. For in-
stance, Wal-Mart found that inexpensive parking lot security could substantially reduce
80% of its crimes that occurred in the parking lot or outside perimeter of its stores. Mc-
Clung v. Delta Square L.P., 937 S.W.2d 891, 904 n.13 (Tenn. 1996). In addition, questions
of accountability are critical. For example, in one case a motel in a high crime area had
provided alarms to protect its television sets though not its guests. Wassell v. Adams, 865
F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1989).
286. Given the effects of comparative apportionment and several liability on sexual as-
sault victims' ability to recover compensation from negligent defendants, advocates for
sexual assault victims have opposed legislation advocating "comparative responsibility."
When the Connecticut Supreme Court decided to compare intentional and negligent fault,
groups including the Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services and the Legal Assistance
Resource Center of Connecticut (a low-income advocacy organization) successfully ap-
pealed to that state's legislature to overturn the court's decision. Thomas Scheffey,
Lawmakers Unmake Bhinder, THE CONN. L. TRIB., May 10, 1999. Similarly, when Penn-
sylvania considered a comparative apportionment law, victims rights groups like Mothers
Against Drunk Driving spoke out against it, and only a comparative fault bill was passed.
287. See, e.g., Korhonen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 833, 834 (Me. 2003); Am. Com-
merce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1189 (R.I. 2002).
288. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc., 642 N.W.2d 648, 651
(Iowa 2002); Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 48 P.3d 137, 148 (Or. 2002).
289. See, e.g., R.W. v. Schrein, 642 N.W.2d 505,508 (Neb. 2002); Ross v. Home Ins. Co.,
773 A.2d 654, 656 (N.H. 2001); T.M. v. Executive Risk Indem. Inc., 59 P.3d 721, 723 (Wyo.
2003).
290. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, 821 A.2d 52, 62 (Md. 2003) (holding that
$1.15 million compensatory and punitive damage award against police officer who raped
motorist could not be collected from county self insurance funds).
291. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Bridgeport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 801 A.2d
752, 754 (Conn. 2002).
292. See United Fire & Cas. Co., 642 N.W.2d at 652 ("The district court found and there
is no dispute on appeal, that the jury's verdicts against [the assailant] for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and indecent exposure were 'clearly based on intentional con-
duct and not an 'occurrence' as defined in the policy"'); cf. Vibert v. Bd. of Educ. of Reg'l
Sch. Dist. No. 10, 793 A.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Conn. 2002) (holding that school did not have to
defend teacher against sexual assault action brought by former student). At times, insur-
ance policies may disclaim only "intentional acts by the insured," in which case an inten-
tional tort caused by the insured's child may be covered, as it was in Morris. Morris v. Yogi
Bear's Jellystone Park Camp Resort, 539 So. 2d 70, 72 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
293. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Engelmann, 639 N.W.2d 192, 198 (S.D.
2002).
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parties.294
The cases law here reveals the confusion and disarray that sustains re-
peated litigation. When a victim seeks insurance coverage from the assail-
ant based on claims of negligence, recovery is uncertain. In professional
liability policies, for example, the question is often whether the plaintiff
suffered damages resulting from "the providing or withholding of profes-
sional services." Professional services are frequently defined as those ser-
vices that require training and skill.2 95 Some courts ask whether the
assault itself is a professional service, in which case coverage is almost
certainly unavailable. 296 As courts hasten to note, sexual assault is a type
of misconduct for which no training is required. 297 However, other juris-
dictions ask instead whether the sexual assault was intertwined with the
professional services. 298 Although this distinction could make a differ-
ence in cases that involve sexual assault that occurs during the provision
of professional services-for example an assault by a doctor on a patient
during a physical exam or by a lawyer on a client during a legal counsel-
ing session 299-it does not necessarily do so.300 Even when the victim
pleads the assailant's professional negligence not an intentional tort, and
when the sexual assault takes place in the office in the course of the pro-
fessional relationship, some courts applying this test have precluded
coverage.301
And yet, coverage is not uniformly precluded. If the victim can make
an allegation that the jury's negligence verdict was based on either the
sexual assault or other professional misconduct, insurance coverage may
be accessible. For example, in the case of a gynecologist who was accused
of raping plaintiffs during gynecological exams, the insurer provided the
defendant doctor with "a splendid defense" in a case that presented two
theories of negligence to the jury-improper sexual contact, and using
"improper positions, procedures and methods in conducting those exami-
nations. ' 30 2 In its fealty to the insured, the insurer did not advocate for
special interrogatories or special verdicts on the allegations. 30 3 Because a
general verdict was entered "subject to two different constructions," one
294. See Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1189 (R.I. 2002).
295. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d at 197.
296. See Ross v. Home Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 654, 657 (N.H. 2001); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d at 198.
297. See R.W. v. Schrein, 642 N.W.2d 505, 513 (Neb. 2002); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 639 N.W.2d at 198.
298. See Ross, 773 A.2d at 657.
299. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d at 197-70 (saying it is not a
jurisdiction that covers the physician rather than the services, but then allowing the cover-
age question in the circumstances of that case).
300. See Schrein, 642 N.W.2d at 515; Ross, 773 A.2d at 657-58 (citing intertwined stan-
dard but then denying coverage for claim that arose in professional's professional setting).
301. In several insurance cases, courts have held that professional liability policies do
not cover liability for sexual assault by professionals like lawyers or doctors even if the
assaults take place in the office and during the course of the professional's practice. See,
e.g., Schrein, 642 N.W.2d at 515 (no public policy requiring payment); Ross, 773 A.2d 654.
302. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 639 N.W.2d at 198.
303. Id.
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of which "was sustainable for coverage purposes," it was arguable that
the judgment fell within the scope of the insurance coverage. 30 4
Perhaps the difference between this outcome and the outcome of other
cases in which the professional's malpractice was also asserted is simply
that there was a stronger tag along case of medical negligence not based
on the sexual assault itself.30 5 But that potential point of reconciliation
seems far from certain.3° As one state supreme court justice noted, care-
ful pleading is particularly important in cases involving sexual
misconduct. 307
If coverage in cases in which the assailant was alleged to have been
negligent is uncertain, the availability of coverage when a third party was
alleged to have been negligent is even more contested.30 8 In some cases,
courts have held that insurance covers third-party negligence claims
against the insured. For example in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelly
Funeral Home, Inc., the Iowa Supreme Court held that under a commer-
cial general liability policy a negligent supervision claim was covered be-
cause the sexual assault was not bodily injury "expected or intended from
the standpoint of the insured" company.30 9 From the standpoint of the
insured (unlike the standpoint of its employee), the assault was an acci-
dent. Because the negligence was considered an accident rather than an
intended injury, the CGL policy could cover the victim's claim. 310 The
New York Supreme Court reached a similar holding that sexual assault by
the insured's employee qualified as an "accident" with respect to the in-
sured.311 The word "occurrence" in an insurance contract has been inter-
304. Id.
305. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins., 860 A.2d 909, 920 (Md.
2004) (holding that teacher's liability insurer had a duty to defend teacher in student's
lawsuit alleging sexual abuse because "there was more alleged and discovered ... than
simply the sexual abuse," including an inappropriate relationship with gifts and love notes).
306. Schrein, 642 N.W.2d at 509 (alleging that doctor unnecessarily inserted a tube into
the plaintiff's penis along with other claims of sexual assault); Ross, 773 A.2d at 656 (alleg-
ing breach of fiduciary duty by lawyer who asked client to come to the office to sign docu-
ments and raped her, though it is not clear whether the breach claim was entirely focused
on the sexual assault itself or also the failure to explain or recommend appropriate docu-
ments for example).
307. W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 492 (W. Va. 2004) (Starcher, J.,
concurring) ("[t]he obvious rule for plaintiff's lawyers to take away from this case is to
carefully plead any case involving sexual misconduct or other intentional tort").
308. Compare Bd. of Educ. of Bridgeport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 801 A.2d
752, 757 (Conn. 2002) (showing liability insurance policy that covered injuries from "use"
of the school bus, included coverage for sexual assault when special education student was
sexually assaulted after getting off of the bus without supervision), with State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Kastner, 77 P.3d 1256, 1265 (Colo. 2003) (holding that automobile insur-
ance did not cover sexual assault that took place in plaintiff's automobile because the term
"use" of a vehicle did not include non-transportation usc).
309. 642 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Iowa 2002).
310. See also C.P. ex rel. M.L. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 1216, 1223-24 (Alaska 2000)
(deciding that sexual assault was accident from the standpoint of insured parents even
though it was intended by insured adult son who committed the assault such that coverage
should not have been excluded).
311. RJC Realty Holding Corp. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 1263, 1266
(N.Y. 2004); see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 133
S.W.3d 887, 894 (Texas 2004) (holding that whether priest sexual abuse was an accident
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preted to provide even broader coverage.312 In a similar vein, a
homeowner's policy, while not covering the homeowner father's inten-
tional sexual assault, was nevertheless found potentially applicable to
cover the mother's negligent supervision of the child, where that negli-
gence alleged was arguably separate from the assault itself.313 And when
a psychologist failed to inform state family services that her husband had
been accused of abusing children, her professional liability policy might
cover claims of negligence against her when her husband abused the fos-
ter children she took in her home on a temporary basis.314 The issue was
whether she was providing psychological services to the abused children
such that the professional liability insurance might apply.315
At times, coverage depends on the inferred-intent rule, a rule under
which courts presume intent to harm as a matter of law based on the
nature and character of the insured's acts, regardless of the insured's as-
serted subjective intent. 316 Often the inferred intent rule has been ap-
plied to bar coverage in sexual assault cases. 317 However, that rule may
not apply in cases where a minor committed the assaults, because minors'
relative lack of experience in sexual matters makes it imporper to infer an
intent to injure.318
In contrast to the large number of cases affording coverage for third-
party-negligence claims, in a number of similar cases, allegations of third-
party negligence were not covered by other CGL or homeowners insur-
ance policies.319 At times, the insurance contracts did not cover "bodily
injury" at all (whether or not expected or intended), 320 or the intentional
misconduct source of the plaintiff's injury was enough to bar coverage,
even if the insured itself had not committed any intentional tort and was
alleged to have been a negligent third party. 321 A number of contracts
was to be measured from the standpoint of the insured diocese and fact issues concerning
the knowledge of the diocese precluded summary judgment for the insurer).
312. See N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 151, 157 (Vt. 2001) (holding in declaratory
judgment on homeowner's liability insurance that sexual assault by son of children in home
day-care was occurrence).
313. Korhonene v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 A.2d 833, 837-39 (Me. 2003) (noting that the
negligent supervision alleged was not for the assault itself, but for the child's access to
alcohol, the mother's failure to learn of the assault, and the mother's assignment of blame
to the child).
314. See T.M. v. Executive Risk Indem. Inc., 59 P.3d 721, 724 (Wyo. 2003). Of course, a
number of these cases depend on specific policy language, as in this case. But the policy
language itself does not seem to provide a predictable guide to outcomes.
315. Id. at 727.
316. See N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 151, 158 (Vt. 2001).
317. See id.
318. See id. at 159.
319. See Ross v. Home Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 654, 658 (N.H. 2001). In some cases, courts
have found that the employer is not covered under a CGL policy for assaults by its employ-
ees at work or outside of work. See Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 48 P.3d 137, 138 (Or.
2002).
320. See M.C. v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., I P.3d 673, 676 (Alaska 2000).
321. See W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 492 (W. Va. 2004) (sexual
assaults on six-year-old by uncle and concealment of assaults by child's grandparents were
deliberate acts that did not constitute an accident); Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811
A.2d 1185, 1201-02 (R.I. 2002); Kim v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 6 P.3d 264, 270 (Alaska 2000)
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contained explicit sexual assault exclusions, which were sometimes read
broadly by the courts.322 This was the case in the recent Rhode Island
Supreme Court case American Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto.323 In Porto, a
boy scout was sexually molested by his troop leader. The boy and his
parents brought suit against the boy scouts as well as the leader's supervi-
sor. Against the supervisor, the boy scout claimed negligent hiring, negli-
gent supervision, and negligent failure to educate the boys about how to
respond to sexual assault.324 Although the claim against the supervisor
was for negligence and could not have been for anything more, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's homeowner's in-
surance did not cover the negligence claims against him.325 In reaching
its conclusion, rather than adopt a narrow view of the exclusion, 326 the
court adopted a broad interpretation of the policy exclusion for claims
"arising out of actual or threatened sexual molestation. ' 327 Rather than
confine the clause to a denial of coverage to the perpetrator of a sexual
assault, the court extended the exclusion to any claims that had a causal
connection with actual, alleged, or threatened sexual molestation.328 The
court adopted an equally expansive view of what constituted "threatened
sexual molestation." The court defined this term to include not only un-
wanted sexual contact, but also "verbal advances or displaying sexually
(holding that commercial automobile insurance did not cover taxicab driver's sexual as-
sault of minor passenger because damages were not result of "accident" and injuries were
"expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured"), overruled by Shaw v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 P.3d 588, 591, 590 (Alaska 2001) (noting that the appellant in
Kim did not argue that "the abuse could have been an 'accident' from the minor's perspec-
tive even though it was not an 'accident' from the tortfeasor's perspective"). Of course
ordinarily the injury is also expected from the standpoint of the assailant. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Engelmann, 639 N.W.2d 192, 195-96 (S.D. 2002).
322. See, e.g., Cmty. Action for Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. Am. Alliance Ins.
Co., 757 A.2d 1074, 1081-82 (Conn. 2000).
323. 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002).
324. Id. at 1189.
325. Id. at 1202.
326. See RJC Realty Holding Corp. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 1263
(N.Y. 2004) (holding that clause that excluded insurance for claims "arising out of" a body
massage only included injuries like bruises from a massage rather than a sexual assault as
well).
327. Am. Commerce Ins. Co., 811 A.2d at 1197.
328. Id. at 1195. Perhaps more disconcerting than the lack of a public policy analysis in
the Rhode Island court's reasoning, was the court's evident confusion on the issue of cau-
sation. For example, the court stated that "[p]roximate cause [in tort cases] is established
by showing that but for the negligence of the tortfeasor, injury to the plaintiff would not
have occurred." Id. However, the but-for test is the test of actual, not proximate cause.
Thus when the court wrote, in its conclusion that "[b]ut for the allegations injuries to [the
plaintiff] arising from [the Boy Scout leader's] sexual assault, [the co-leader's] alleged neg-
ligence would not have caused [the plaintiff] any bodily injury damages whatsoever and the
family would have no claims for loss of consortium," id. at 1202, one wonders, so what?
No one alleged that the defendant was the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Actual
cause analysis, and even proximate cause analysis, can accommodate injuries that stem
from more than one act of negligent or intentional misconduct. If the homeowner had
negligently supervised his child, who then intentionally put ice on the floor on which the
plaintiff slipped, it would be remarkable if the court precluded insurance coverage to the
homeowner on the ground that there would have been no claim against the homeowner
absent the intentional tort.
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explicit images or suggestive pictures to the victim" since they may
"sometimes lead to" an actual sexual assault upon the victim. 329 With
those all-encompassing interpretations of the exclusion, even plaintiff's
claim that he was shown pornography was considered part of the actual
or threatened molestation for insurance purposes. 330
At issue in the case law quite centrally is the availability of insurance
coverage and some consistency in determinations and policy goals. The
Rhode Island court outlined plaintiff's public policy arguments as well as
those raised by the defendant. However, the court did not directly ad-
dress any of the arguments. Instead, the court wrote that the exclusion
did not violate public policy because the exclusion was written into the
contract language-an expansive right-to-contract analysis which would
seem to preclude any discussion of public policy concerns.331
Even in the context of workers compensation coverage, coverage ques-
tions have not followed uniform patterns or turned on simple at-work/off-
work distinctions. When the sexual assault took place in the course of
employment and during work hours, workers compensation may or may
not furnish the sexual assault victim's exclusive source of
compensation. 332
Ultimately, while insurance litigation will always depend on the partic-
ular language of the policy at issue and the particular circumstances of the
case at issue, policy language did not appear to play a pivotal role in cov-
erage determinations. Instead, when the insured has committed sexual
assault, coverage may depend on the plaintiff's attorney's artful de-
fense-particularly simultaneous proof of the insured's additional negli-
gence-and the luck of the draw with respect to coverage of third-party
claims of negligence. The question still contested in state courts is
whether exclusions for intentional torts bar coverage even when those
torts are negligent with respect to the insured. More attention should also
be paid to questions about whether public policy supports or rejects cov-
erage of negligence claims against assailants and third parties. 333
329. Id. at 1199.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1201.
332. See Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470, 480 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (not covering
sexual harassment and assault in the course of employment under worker's compensation);
Driscoll v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 752 A.2d 1069, 1076 (Conn. 2000) (holding that workers'
compensation, even if little or none was available for sexual assault, provided employee's
exclusive compensation); Rogers v. Burger King Corp., 82 P.3d 116, 121 (Okla. 2003)
(workers' compensation act provided exclusive remedy for worker abducted from work at
gunpoint and sexually assaulted). Of course, workers' compensation acts do not bar em-
ployee claims against third parties. See Wood v. Guilford County, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494
(N.C. 2002). See generally Jane Kom, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual
Harassment, 67 TUL . L. Rnv. 1363, 1417 (1993) (arguing that workers' compensation
should not be the exclusive remedy for sexual harassment). Workers' compensation does
not preclude an employee's contract claims. Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d
555, 561 (Utah 2000).
333. See R.W. v. Schrein, 642 N.W.2d 505, 516 (Neb. 2002) (noting that the state re-
quires proof of insurance coverage in order to practice in the state, and suggesting a need
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D. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF VICTIMS
A final set of issues worthy of special note in the current tort litigation
concerns sexual assault victims' privacy interests.33 4 These privacy con-
cerns include both the protection of victim privacy and confidentiality
within civil litigation, and the vindication of victim privacy interests
through tort privacy actions.
In the first context, issues surrounding victim privacy are at issue even
before a sexual assault victim pursues a legal action. In a number of cur-
rent cases, evidence gatherers who may subsequently be sued as tort de-
fendants can have real conflicts of interests with sexual assault victims.
For example, in Kravitz v. Beech Hospital,335 the doctor at the drug and
alcohol treatment facility at which the plaintiff was allegedly raped, gath-
ered evidence from the plaintiff about her rape even though that doctor
was also an employee of the facility that later became a defendant in the
case. 336 Similarly in Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp,337 a woman who
was sexually assaulted in her workplace was required to speak with the
employee assistance program personnel rather than an outside coun-
selor.338 In these situations, the person gathering evidence from the vic-
tim about her sexual assault has a conflict of interest with the victim
herself. On the one hand the victim may view the doctor or counselor as
her fiduciary, and on the other hand that person, as an employee of the
defendant, may not be acting in that capacity. This situation raises con-
cerns about objectivity and informed consent. If victims are not attended
by independent evidence-gatherers after the rape, legal doctrines could
be set in place that would require the defendant's employees to give vic-
tims information about potential conflicts of interest as well as their avail-
able neutral alternatives. Such warnings might be required at the
defendant's peril if they are not issued.
Once within the legal process, issues about discovery of private infor-
mation are important in civil as well as criminal cases. From the very
beginning of tort litigation, privacy issues can arise. One issue is whether
the plaintiff can proceed pseudonomously. While these proceedings are
common in sexual assault cases, 33 9 at least one court was hostile to such
proceedings in light of the plaintiff's initiation of the case.340 Evidentiary
for compensation for people harmed but also expressing concern about insurance as a po-
tential shield to professionals from the consequences of their actions).
334. See Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape
Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 473 (2005) (asserting that for most sexual assault
victims, "privacy is like oxygen," a constant need).
335. 808 A.2d 34 (N.H. 2002).
336. Id. at 40.
337. 16 P.3d 555 (Utah 2000).
338. Id. at 559 n.2 (demand that victim see in-house employee assistance personnel was
not a violation of the victim's privacy).
339. See, e.g., Doe Parents No. 1 v. Dep't of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 552 n.2 (Haw. 2003);
L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 917 n.1 (Alaska 2001).
340. See Doe v. Briscoe, No. CL02-499, 2003 WL 22748373 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
2003).
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concerns, particularly with respect to the victim's prior sexual contact
may also be at issue. Evidence about a victim's history of prior sexual
contacts or abuse often arises in litigation. For example, although the
Kravitz court said that it would bar evidence about the victim's prior sex-
ual contacts, a witness nevertheless testified about those contacts and the
court held that the victim's case had not been prejudiced by the testi-
mony.34a Discussion of the victim's past sexual contacts and history of
prior sexual abuse often appear in even appellate court opinions.342
However, some courts have been deliberately sensitive to privacy con-
cerns when writing opinions, omitting details of the assaults not necessary
to discussion of the legal issues and likely to further embarrass the victim
throughout the civil litigation. 343 Evidence regarding of prior sexual con-
tacts may be at issue for assailants as well as plaintiffs. 344 In the third-
party context, where prior incidents are considered a factor in foresee-
ability, the relevant question may be admissibility of prior similar inci-
dents, which can be prejudicial against the landowner but also necessary
to the issue of foreseeability or notice. 345
Sexual assault victims can affirmatively seek vindication of their pri-
vacy interests through the tort law. The two most likely privacy torts
under which a victim can bring suit are the tort of intrusion on seclusion,
and the tort of publication of private facts. To prove the first tort, the
plaintiff must show that there is an intentional intrusion on a matter of
private concern, which would be considered highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person.346 To prove the second form of privacy invasion, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant publicly disclosed a private fact about the
plaintiff, which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is
not a matter of legitimate public concern. 347 A recent state supreme court
case that examines the privacy causes of action in a sexual-assault case is
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp.3 4 8 In that case the plaintiff, a server in
a banquet department, was sexually assaulted in the lounge area of her
workplace while she was on a break.349 The assault was recorded by se-
curity cameras. The employer displayed the full videotape of the em-
ployee's sexual assault to at least twelve individuals.350 Although it is
unclear exactly who saw the tape, the plaintiff alleged that several of
these people had no legitimate interest in viewing the tape.351 In re-
341. 808 A.2d 34 at 40.
342. See, e.g., L.C.H. v. T.S., 28 P.3d 915, 919 (Alaska 2001).
343. See, e.g., Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
344. See, e.g., Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 834 (Ala. 2000) (barring evidence of sexual
assaults doctor committed on other men in light of tort reform statute).
345. See Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 663, 674 (W. Va. 2001).
346. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). The Florida Su-
preme Court rejected an intrusion on seclusion claim based on unwanted sexual touching
in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2003).
347. DOBBS, supra note 151, § 427, at 1203.
348. 16 P.3d 555, 553 (Utah 2000)
349. Id. at 557.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 559.
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sponse to the plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy based on public dis-
closure of embarrassing facts, the court ruled that public disclosure had
not occurred because the employer displayed the videotape of the assault
to "only twelve to thirteen individuals, '352 some for the legitimate pur-
poses of a criminal investigation, and others who were not specifically
identified.
Another case in which privacy torts have not proven robust enough to
protect victim privacy interests is Dye v. Wallace.353 In that case, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that even publication of a child rape vic-
tim's name is not remediable in a tort privacy case based on the First
Amendment rights enumerated in Florida Star v. B.F.J.354 However, in a
footnote the court counseled that states can enact legislation requiring
police to redact victims' identifying information.3 55 In some states, such
legislation has been enacted and upheld. 356
As in the criminal context, issues of privacy must be addressed in tort,
to preserve victims' autonomy and dignity.
CONCLUSION
Like a mosaic of tiny pieces, the many recent judgments issued in cases
filed by sexual assault victims present a picture of a contrasting and con-
tested area of law without clear resolution. Ideally, state tort law meets its
goals if it deters sexual assault, holds appropriate parties accountable for
the damage done by the assaults, and provides adequate compensation to
sexual assault victims. But how to deter sexual assault, who is responsible
for it, and whether compensation should be more readily available and
through which mechanisms are all open question-in the courts and in
the culture more generally.
The idea that tort actions may be the solution to the problems in crimi-
nal law has some appeal. Rates of crime in schools and elsewhere have
gone down precipitously in recent years, and it's an open question
whether private policing (and the tort law that encourages it) deserves
some of the credit. Moreover, movements toward victim compensation
funds may do a better job of compensation, but do little to shape private
incentives to reduce risk and may fit poorly with American tendencies to
favor private-law remedies.
But caution about the fate of the public interest when victims drive the
lawsuits is in order. 357 Moreover, a culture can't simply step out of the
room and leave itself behind. A change in fora brings a change in and not
the disappearance of contested issues. Any number of issues arise from
352. Id.
353. 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001).
354. Id. at 562 (citing Fla. Star v. B.F.J., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)).
355. Id. at 563 n.1.
356. See Cape Publ'ns v. City of Louisville, 147 S.W.3d 731, 735 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).
357. See William H.J. Hubbard, Comment, Civil Settlement During Rape Prosecutions,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1231 (1999).
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the many cases resolved in the last few years alone. Courts and legisla-
tures need to consider whether to create torts for touchings that are reck-
less or negligent with respect to harm or offense, create or avoid specially
drawn statutes for victims of sexual assault,358 and increase access to legal
services. Moreover, statutes specifically designed to protect crime victims
in the civil courts may do more harm than good to victim interests if they
import criminal-law rule into civil courts.
In terms of suits against third parties, though the defendant-duty issue
is no longer the primary focus of third-party litigation, the questions of
responsibility for rape prevention still are central-both on its own, and
in relation to the responsibilities of others. How victims of these injuries
can seek financial assistance and do so in a way that preserves their pri-
vacy and dignity becomes important as well.3 59
The cases themselves do not answer the many policy questions that
courts, the academic environment, and the broader public have set before
them. However, the cases provide a vivid array of issues and analysis
from which those policy discussions can begin.
358. This has been done in some states. See Michael Kiefer, Statute of Limitations Al-
tered: 2 Awards Could Total $19 Mil, Amz. REPUBLIC, Jul. 10, 2004, at 3B. But these
changes have been argued to limit victim interests. See also Savage v. Utah, 104 P.3d 1242
(Utah 2004) (rejecting argument that discovery statute means that claims can be brought
only against natural persons rather than corporations).
359. Perhaps it is also fair to ask at this juncture whether the viability of the tort law in
third-party actions has stunted the development of the criminal law. See Belluck, supra
note 6, at A31 (quoting a law professor who said he did not think grand juries and prosecu-
tors in other jurisdictions would file criminal negligence charges against other diocese who
hide and continue to expose children to sexual abuse because, although "dioceses have
done horrible things for which they should be held fully accountable in civil courts, none of
the dioceses have committed any crimes").
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